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THE CITY. (*Glaucon loquitur.*)

By R. LAWSON.

There is a city in the soul (he said)—
An image of the city laid up in heaven;
And in that heavenly city there abide
The perfect forms of all existences—
No abstract symbols, but the living ideas—
The essential Good, the Beautiful, the Just;
They are the harmonious end of all desire.
He who once sees them has escaped the flux
Of things of sense—they are and were and will be.
Through these and round about them reigns *To On*—
Reality which never fades away.
Good is the cause of essence and of being.
And (when I said this went beyond my thought)
There is, he said, a path, dear Glaucon; but
Where *I* go, *you* can not as yet, although
I strive my best for you. But could you go,
You would I know behold no phantoms, like
The shadows in the cave, but Truth itself.
This vision is for trained disciples only.
Man is a heavenly, not an earthly, plant.
The soul that habits in our mortal clay—
To test the life it chose ere birth began,
Sojourning as a prisoner the while—
Once in the city dwelt and saw the Ideas
Not darkened puzzlingly, but face to face.
Still hears it those uranian cadences,
In music of the dialectic hymn:
Still bears remembrance of the perfect forms.
'Twould build again the city that it knew,
Would fashion terrene images thereof,
Knowing such city never is nor will be
Except where spiritual essences have sway.
Yet must it build, rebuild, even here on earth—
According to the image that it bears—
The would-be perfect city, where all men

In Justice knit, in toil co-operant,
Shall give their best to stead the general weal,
Seeking no recompense beyond the joy
To know the Beautiful, the Good, the Just.
Virtue is knowledge, vice is ignorance;
No man deliberately chooses evil,
Knowing it such—once he has left the cave.
He who can scan all time and all existence
Knows human values in themselves are naught.
They have no permanence, no immanence
In Being—they appear and change and pass,
Phenomenal and not realities.
Who once beholds the city knows the truth.
Honour, ambition, money, sense-indulgence—
All these are naught; they do but clog the soul
And blind it to the vision of the Good.
There is a lion housed within the body,
Linked with a beast of many changing heads.
Happy the man whose soul controls this lion—
Unhappy he whose soul this lion controls.
The one is, though in poverty, still a king,
The other though, in splendour, still a slave.
No rest from ills shall ever come to cities—
No, nor the human race, till that far day
When there shall come one man, or group of men—
Monarch or oligarchy matters not—
Who with eyes fixed on the eternal pattern,
Will in himself conjoin philosophy
With kingship—justice then at last will resign.
Remember what said Er, the Pamphylian
(He who came back to us from out the dead—
Who saw the tyrant Ardiaeus punished,
Who saw the daughters of Necessity,
Who heard the harmony of the circles eight,
And saw the souls that drank of Lethe's stream
After their journey of a thousand years)—
"Hold with an adamant grip this faith—
That life is best which makes the soul more just."
Thus, Glaucon, has the tale been saved, and we
May pass the river of Forgetfulness
Without defilement, if we hold to virtue.
The way lies upward, but the goal is sure—
The immortal soul can bear both good and ill.
Onward, then, in our heavenly pilgrimage!
There is a city in the soul (he said)
An image of the city built in heaven.

PROBLEM SOLVING BY MEN AND MAMMALS.¹

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INTRODUCTION.

THIS subject is best approached through the dynamic conception of psychology as "*the adjustment of the organism to a given situation*". Naturally when one considers such situations and the adjustment which is made, the one postulate that is assumed is that we tend only to regard the most complex achievement of which the organism is capable and to assume that less complex problems than this may be solved by the particular type of individual involved in so far as these are in keeping with its nature. Thus, for instance, if a rat can learn a maze involving ten alternative sets of paths, then less than ten alternatives could also be learned; again, if a primate can learn to manipulate two fastenings of a puzzle box in order to escape, then he is able to learn one of these, and so on. On the other hand, it is sometimes advantageous, as in the work of Pavlov, rather to consider the minimum point of achievement as well. This paper will therefore involve the minimum as well as the maximum limits of achievement.

Since our problem, as such, holds many aspects, only one, the cognitive side, involving the fundamental factor of the organism's apprehension of the situation, will be considered, and in this regard it is fundamental that the possible degree of complexity of conditions and the nicety or exactness of the adjustment will be the limiting factors on one side, while their simplicity will involve the other. To use Pillsbury's term, complexity will depend on the "clearness" of attention of which the animal is capable. Now the degree of clearness is a resultant of two factors: (1) the capacity of the individual to analyse the constituent parts of the problems involved, and (2) the degree or tensivity of effort expended in its solution. The former factor is generally referred to as the intelligence level of the organism and the latter as the degree of attention. The second may be assumed as a constant since care is taken, under experimental conditions, to secure such an effort, leaving

¹ This paper was read before a joint meeting of the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy and the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science, Sydney, 22nd August, 1932.

us with the consideration of the factors of intelligence and learning. Apart from the specific problem of human intelligence, there are two theories which are brought forward to account for the mental processes involved. The first, the associationist, is atomistic, in that it involves the principle of learning by accretion of parts by units. Thorndike and the Behaviouristic School are its main protagonists in psychology, while in physiology Pavlov appears from his work also to assume it, and the Behaviourists regard him as an apostle of this belief. The principle involved is simply explained in Thorndike's principle of "the linking or bonding of ideas". It is apparent in Eddinghaus' work upon the learning of nonsense syllables.

Opposed to the simple and direct associationist principle is that of "Gestalt", a recent psychological vogue. Its protagonists reject the principle of the Scottish proverb that "mony a mickle makes a muckle" and retort that "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts", implying the existence of a sort of conjuror's box out of which something appears which was not present before. As the basis of this theory it is assumed invariably that any given situation is mentally perceived or apprehended as a totality, and that the various parts are related to each other as well as to the whole. Since the initial stages of Gestalt investigation were confined to spatial forms, the term "Gestalt" was used to imply this idea of "configuration", or organization of parts of an object in relation to the whole.

At the present time associationism is in direct opposition to Gestalt, the position of either side allowing no concessions to the other. Now the older doctrine of Association at least conceded the principle of Gestalt relationship in its extra associations of similarity and contrast; modern Associationism, on the other hand, allows only the Jamesian principle of association by contiguity in time, or, to use a longer term, "contemporaneity".

The object of this paper is to show what the older and broader concept, involving both the modern schools, obtains in different degrees in different situations; atomistic associationism or accretion by units appears to be operative in simple situations, while meaning and relationship dominate in the solution of more intellectual or complex and abstract problems.

HUMAN MENTALITY AS A BASIC PATTERN.

It may be asked how, from the simple factor of linkage by means of neural paths, through the reduction of the

synaptic resistances it could be possible for "gestalt" wholes implying relationships, to be evolved. If one admits the validity of Lloyd Morgan's "Law of Emergence" the difficulty is removed. It is then possible to appreciate gestalt as an emergent from the sheer factor of linkage.

Since "man is the measure of all things" and particularly so in matters psychological, we may begin with the study of the growth of human cognition. To do this the more readily it is suggested that a form of cognitional notation, after the style of and leading towards symbolic logic, may be adopted with profit. It also involves Spearman's notation of the principles of noëgenesis, explained in his work, "The Nature of Intelligence".

(a) *Sensation*. In man we may assume the perfected development of a number of sensory organs and sense endings whereby contact is made and maintained with the external world and his own personality, such as the eye, ear, tongue and such special endings as touch contact, pain, warmth and cold. The actual experiences of an individual, however, are not "single" as regards these. We do not, in the abstract, taste, hear, smell, see, touch, *et cetera*, but always experience *an object* of some description or other so far as we may examine our experiences. By abstraction we may sort out and examine each of these separate sense experiences by holding all conditions of perceiving constant, save the one which is the subject of experiment, but then we merely ignore, in our results, the constant factors and detach variant single sense experiences. At the same time we may assume that these sense experiences do play a part in the total situation, and we shall designate them by means of "perpendicular" rectangles designated S_1 , S_2 , S_3 , *et cetera*, as in Fig. 1.




Fig. 1.

(b) *Perception*. Now in any simple situation some or all of our sense organs act together in combination, and, as the principle of Gestalt asserts, they combine into a distinct whole. Thus if one makes the accompanying mark on a black-board before a class, the members do not rest content with

passively accepting these as a set of stimulations to the rods of the retina involving space and brightness, but without ado attempt to read a meaning into the cryptic scrawl. Many interpret it as a set of initials, others as digits and a discerning few as a mere scrawl. The sensory data have not been




Fig. 2.

merely added to each other, but the meaning factor combines and relates the various sensory factors into one whole. Thus Koehler quotes von Kries to the effect that "meaning transforms sensations into things". The whole percept may be dominated symbolically as in Fig. 3 with the meaning factor represented by a square and initial as M. This stage is what Titchener designates a primary percept. Soon, however,




Fig. 3.—Primary Percept.

the process is simplified. When the object has become well known, then just one sensory stimulation alone is sufficient to carry on from this clue to the mental set of "meaning", and the remaining sensory factors of the situation are assumed or "ghosted" in as "tied images" and may be so symbolized as in Fig. 4. This represents a secondary percept which is the nature of most of our later perceptual experience.




Fig. 4.—Secondary Percept.

The directions of the arrows towards M , from S_1 , and outwards from M to S_2 , S_3 , *et cetera*, are to be noted.

Now any single sensory clue may involve more than one meaning (Fig. 5), one of which will be the correct one for the total object and the other a wrong one. The correct




Fig. 5.—Illusion.

meaning either M_1 or M_2 must be now found by observing whether either of the alternatives S_2 and S_3 , *et cetera*, coincides with the actual and precise situation. This check up will resolve one or other “ M s” where the sensory images and existent factors do not coincide into an illusion. As an example, one may notice the back of a human figure in a garb well known to the observer as that of a close acquaintance. On going up to the figure and touching it, then the other sensory features, face, tone of voice *et cetera*, do not fit into the picture. As a further illustration, one may instance the completion of the percept in the case of a telephone call. From the pitch and intonation of voice one reconstructs as a whole percept the individual at the other end of the “wire”. It actually helps one to do this voluntarily. On the other hand, there is always the risk of illusion which may not be allowed for if the responder

be not psychologically minded. As a further and personal illustration, the writer, while in New York, saw just in the dusk of twilight a charmingly dressed young lady walking with her handbag open. On saying, "Excuse me, miss, but your 'pocket book' is open and you may lose your purse", great was his consternation to be thanked, when the charming female turned her head, by a dusky coloured person with pronounced negroid characteristics.

To this level of perceptual cognition most animals probably arrive, but with varying degrees of versatility. The situations must be real and practical and not ideal. Meaning for them, if any, is merely incipient or implicit. With this in mind we may readily see how, from a certain type of sensory clue in a new situation, there may be a simple and direct or analogous *transfer of meaning to a new situation*. A rat will recognize any open cavity or passage as a possibility of refuge; a quickly moving object even such as a motor car will attract a dog of the kelpie or collie type to its pursuit as a quarry. Give another nut to a caged squirrel, who is replete, and he will make pretence of burying it. The range of possible adjustments will depend on the inborn capacities of the animal or its level of intellect. But there is a further stage to which mammals may proceed. The rat placed for the first time in the maze is hungry, but when put into the starting box often waits for some time before setting out to explore its possibilities. Almost when on the point of arriving at the food box at the end, he will return in his tracks to the start or will wait for long periods in a blind alley. But after a few successful performances there occurs a sudden drop in the time taken, and the parabola of the performance curve makes a sudden descent. This process is designated "insight" in learning.

In a recent research in the Sydney laboratories a unit maze was used. After learning the first maze, the twenty-four rats were divided into two groups. The first was put into a maze with its first four units altered, the second group into a maze completely altered throughout. The curves are shown below in Fig. 6.

In the second case both groups reduced their initial times enormously. As the advocates of the gestalt point out, the sudden reduction of time in the initial performance was due to "*insight*", i.e., into some appreciation of the fact that the sensory clues of the starting cage took on a *meaning* or a significance, viz., that of promise of food. To use Pavlov's term, the starting cage became a conditioning factor. We may

pause here to ask is there any associative or simple linkage factor present in such an example. The difference in the pair of curves in favour of Group 1, where the maze was only partly altered, appears to be an argument in favour of this, while, on the other hand, it is admittedly overshadowed by




Fig. 6.

the transfer of incipient meaning in the savings on the first performance. It is to be noted that such a transfer would also be styled by an associationist a mere linkage, but the advocate of the gestalt theory would insist on the presence of the meaning factor in the insight involved.

TRANSFER OF COMPLEX MEANINGS.

Another experiment will illustrate more complex possibilities. A set of three signal lights of different intensities were arranged:

- a* = dim.
- b* = medium.
- c* = bright.

Chickens were taught or "conditioned" to respond to the middle member of the series by obtaining food at the door which this one showed. When they had learnt to respond

without a mistake, a new series was arranged by dropping (*a*) the dim, and adding (*d*) a very bright member. The new series now consisted of—

b = medium,

c = bright,

d = very bright;

and the alternatives were for the chickens who had previously been trained to respond to either absolutely to the medium light (*b*) or relatively to (*c*), the middle member of the series. A satisfactory percentage, *viz.*, 82%, responded to (*c*), the middle member of the new series, leaving about 18% which responded absolutely to the absolute standard of the medium. The result illustrates the possibility of the transfer from an old to a new situation not of an absolute sensory clue but to a relative factor, *viz.*, the midmost of a series.

LEARNED SITUATIONS.

Up to this stage we have considered only the factor of transition from old clues to a new situation, the original insight having been acquired through the gradual factor of repetition. All psychologists would agree in styling this principle of gradual acquirement of *learning* by insight. It would appear to the majority that a measure of the linkage factor was involved therein, whereas the meaning factor also played a part. The meaning is thus arrived at in a mediate fashion. The transfer is probably by means of an implicit analogy with a similar situation.

INTELLIGENCE.

When, however, the factor of repetition is absent and the individual responds to a situation by showing immediate insight into the problem and at the once arrives at a solution by cognition of the meaning involved, then the situation is recognized as one involving intelligence. Thus Hobhouse, in his work entitled "*Mind in Evolution*", first used this principle with animals, while Thorndike confined himself to the former method, that of measuring learning capacity. The latest worker of note to reintroduce the principle of immediate solution was Koehler, who used apes as subjects. He, like Hobhouse, found that, when morsels of food were placed beyond reach of the animal outside the bars of the cage, the animal utilized as rude tools such means as a twig, a wire, a blanket or any other such material on hand. To reach food suspended from a height inaccessible by climbing, the animals would pile up boxes one upon the other, using up to three,

though in many cases the boxes had to be steadied by holding or by the placing of weights within them. One of the cleverest of the chimpanzees acquired the method of jointing two sticks, made ready for that purpose, but none of the others achieved this feat. A recent repetitive experiment made in Russia appears to confirm the results of Koehler, and to indicate that the ourang-outang is unable to accomplish the last problem, which is apparently about the high water mark of intellectual achievement among mammals below man so far as experimental work has proceeded to date. One may here point out that, up to the present, no one has experimented upon the intellectual level of elephants.

LIMITS OF ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE.

It will be observed that, as indicated, animal intelligence does not proceed beyond problems that are perceptual. Koehler found that none of his chimpanzees attempted to utilize tools or accessories that were out of sight and in other separate but accessible portions of the cage. They were limited to "here and now" factors. Moreover, the situations were those of adjustments to immediate wants and needs.

If now we consider the Binet scale as a fair measure of human mentality, we will find much the same type of situation involved in children as in the case of the apes. Definitions, for instance, are given by the child of five years in "terms of use". "A fork is to eat with, a doll to play with or a pencil to write with", *et cetera*. The queries as to what ought one to do when one is sleepy, cold, or hungry, are also responded to at six years as practical situations. But there is here a great difference in favour of the human being. The situation is an ideal one and not perceptual. The use of language as a mediate factor is involved and, we may also add, the use of the free image as well. So far as chimpanzees are concerned, speech possibilities are limited to a range of thirty sounds which involve pitch rather than consonantal differences.

THE FREE IMAGE.

The image is defined by Kuelpe as a "centrally aroused sensation". This is only a partial explanation and applies to its origin rather than to its emergent function and potentialities. If, for instance, one uses the word fork, table, or pencil, it is possible, from the actual sound of the word associated, or, if one may be permitted the term, "gestalted" with the "meaning" of the term to arouse the sensations involved with the actual object itself. The language symbol

might thus be regarded as a new sensory clue or conditioned as Pavlov would regard it, and it is arbitrarily associated with the object concerned. It also enables the individual voluntarily to recall an object when it is not present, and actually to solve problems by means of ideas. A new capacity, to use Lloyd Morgan's term, appears as an "emergent", and this was not previously present in the factors involved in problem solution. Transfers of meaning hitherto unattainable allow of a wider scope for invention and application to new situations. Further, without even a word symbol as a clue, an image may return as memory or a recombination of sensory factors appear to aid in the solution of a given problem. The symbolic notation of the image may be portrayed as in Fig. 7.




Fig. 7.—Free Image.

CONCEPT AND LANGUAGE.

With the addition of the word symbol appears explicit thought. Before the era of speech primeval man lacked the possibilities of achievement as well as culture, and could have attained little beyond the level of the chimpanzee. The sharp stone used in the hand as a tool limited his mechanical possibilities; a stick as a club, and a stone as a missile or weight were about his limit as weapons. This is hardly an advance upon Koehler's apes. With the advent of a mouth suited to and employing speech and a cerebral speech centre, this simian simplicity changed rapidly into a practical primitive culture. Ideas could now be communicated, utilized and varied to suit new situations. With the advent of speech, the meaning factor was accentuated and set free from its sensory and "here and now" clues, and meaning could now be resolved into its pure essence and combined with another meaning in the form of a concept or transferred to a new situation per medium of the involved conceptual relationship. Thus Fig. 8.




Fig. 8.

We have here arrived at the stage of concept formation typical, according to Spearman's principles of human intelligence, of the evocation of relationships and the possibility of their transfer to new cases; and only through the medium of symbols provided by language in speech or writing does this seem possible. This is demonstrated negatively by the experiences of deaf mutes, who, until they have achieved the possibility of some form of conceptual expression by means of manual signs, are unable to make progress in the acquirement of human culture. The growth of concepts follows a general process from the concrete to the abstract, the best example of this being the Binet scale as it becomes more complex and abstract in accordance with "mental age". At first object concepts appear, then come properties of these derived from the qualities of the object groups to the general concepts of number and their relationships as shown when the individual may count backwards. As the age of puberty arrives the capacity for abstraction has developed, along with a capacity to use symbolic characters as in algebra and geometry, while comprehension of moral relations has proceeded far along with such general principles of classification and abstraction. Human thought might be now symbolically rendered thus as an hierarchical series of relationships (Fig. 9).

But the formation of concepts does not necessarily imply their use. Thinking, as problem solution, does so. So far as one may ascertain from an examination of what occurs, the solution of a problem solved ideationally implies:

1. An orientation period requiring an initial image or group of images whereby the subject familiarizes himself with the situation.

2. The main period involving the use of concepts frequently without accompanying images from the point of view of economy, for where images are dwelt upon and utilized to any extent in the main period of problem solution a greater time is taken up.




Fig. 9.

3. The closing period providing the final statement of the problem with an accompanying image, here again of fairly vivid character. Here the general transition is from meaning to relationships, R_1 , R_2 , R_3 , *et cetera*, to the meaning again which implies a particular situation. It is noteworthy that some few subjects tend to obtain vivid images throughout the process as an accompaniment of the concept of relationships, but where these are reported, the times involved in the task are far longer than those in which the concept relation alone is attended to.

TYPES OF THINKING.

Human thinking may be regarded from three levels of complexity according to the degree of individual invention or originality involved. Thus the easiest type is the following out of a chain of argument as when one assents to the steps of reasoning involved in a lecture or an expository article. The second type includes some degree of originality in the working out of difficult examples where basic types of problems have been demonstrated, as in the case of a mathematical section in a textbook. The third level is entirely original and

constructive, since it involves independent investigation or research as it is mistakenly styled, where the individual first formulates the problem and then works out his solution by independent and original methods. While the first and second are the usual educational methods adopted, much originality may often be involved in them which might also be included under the third head. Many individuals do rediscover almost independently some of the principles involved in knowledge in the process of its acquirement.

REASONING.

We might well ask where reasoning comes in. One gives reasons when one's solution of a problem is challenged or when there is an implication of this. We may here involve the notational relationships which lead us directly into the sphere of symbolic logic.




Fig. 10.

Now the syllogism is not the typical expression of our thinking, though every solution allows of the possibility in order to demonstrate its validity. I once heard an unsophisticated child of five render her reasons into a perfect syllogism. The situation was one in which her playmate was asked to play fairies and take the part of a "brownie". On his asking "why should he", the reply was—

"Boy fairies are brownies.

You're a boy,

Therefore you will have to be a brownie."

Logic does not originate thought, but rather acts in the guise of a "grammar of thought", setting out the rules of the game of reasoning and correcting the wrong solutions. It does not even pretend to examine the assumptions or premises of thought, but only the correct conduct of the operation. The majority of our solutions of problems are never reasoned, but accepted on a pragmatic basis as efficient working solutions. In further support of this it may be stated that so far as one may observe, in problems involved in intelligence tests, the brighter individual tends to arrive at conclusions without

the intermediate steps of reasoning and to obtain solutions by what might be described as accurate guessing so far as the mental effort is concerned.

HUMAN LEARNING.

Thus far has been considered only the factor of Gestalt, or meaning and relationship in regard to the processes of problem solving. So far as the writer is aware, the levels of implicit meaning and the abstractions of relationships have not yet been clearly and distinctly differentiated by its advocates, but it is here assumed that the term "gestalt" covers both and excludes that of association.

We have not, however, yet discussed the factors involved in learning. Here the very implication of repetition and the formation of minor associations between parts may imply only the bare linkages to each other of separate ideas. Let us take a situation in which a child is acquiring language: He sees for the first time the object "boat", and hears the sound associated with it. One may well inquire if the terms are merely "linked" by association or if a definite relationship or meaning is established. One may venture to assert that only some bare degree of association is implied by the very fact of the immediacy of the two ideas which the necessary repetition of such learning implies. Such learning could hardly be regarded as a feat of pure intelligence. On the other hand, in some cases it is possible to insert a mediate relationship, then some measure of gestalt would be implied and the direct learning is often assisted by such. It is Thorndike, the associationist, who discriminates between the two factors of power or altitude of intellect and breadth which involves numbers of associations; breadth he admits partly a function of altitude but particularly of associations.

Arguing on deductive principles, it ought to be possible to arrive by deduction at a point, probably in animal learning, where the gestalt factor is zero and associative factors monopolize the processes, as it is to arrive at the opposite where linkages are at zero and intellectual or gestalt factors are everything in some problem of human thinking such as mathematics, one of the sciences or philosophy or even advanced tests of intelligence.

Now according to Pavlov's work with dogs, any type of sensory stimulus that may be "analysed" out or differentiated from another may be used for conditioning; they include such varied factors as object forms of circle and ellipse with diameters in the proportion of 8:9, a tuning fork of 800 in

differentiation to one of 812 d.v., shades of grey whose differences were below the threshold of discrimination of the human eye and so on. Even nocuous stimuli of a painful nature have been found serviceable. In this last situation, the attitude of the old woman who lived in the shoe is literally reversed; the beating is applied first and the broth after.

All such conditioned reflexes may be inhibited if another stimulus be used contemporaneously with the original. It must therefore be admitted that conditioning stimuli that can be so readily linked up with another in such simple fashion in from eight to eleven repetitions and broken down by the addition of one other single factor, hardly acquire a "meaning"; rather is the connection so slight as to be the merest linkage between the two. Meaning is here reduced to a mere clue or signal. Working with starfish which have no central nervous system whatever, but are mere aggregations of reflexes, it is reported that one observer taught his subject to use one arm predominantly in righting itself. Surely at this point of neural development association or linkage is the only factor worth considering.

While the symptoms of human neuroses are perfectly irrational in character, yet one would hesitate to reduce them, as the Behaviourists do, to a sheer level of associationism or conditioning. On the other hand, many idiosyncrasies or personal habits are of this minimal character.

Cason's work on the conditioned reflex in human beings involved the use of an electric bell as stimulus and pupillary dilation as the accompanying reflex action. Such a simple form of learning must be acquired at a low neural level, for the dilation of the pupil is not controllable by volitional effort. To attribute more "meaning" than that implied in the term, "bond or linkage" to this and to Pavlov's work would imply far more than is just or reasonable. On the other hand, "meaning" facilitates the learning or conditioning process where it may be clearly educed, and it achieves its maximum where relationships may be used to connect meaning. There is, with animals, an incipient stage where meaning is a dubious factor, and other stages below this where meaning is not even rudimentary. It is easy to transfer this factor from the human level and read it into those of animal and low level human learning. But in doing so, one cannot but be guilty of the charge of anthropomorphism.

SUMMARY.

There are two opposed theories which attempt to account for the processes of problem solution involved in learning and

intelligence. The former is neural in its basis and postulates the existence of a bare connection as a bonding or linkage of two experiences. The second theory, that of gestalt, implies that learning or apprehension involves a relationship of the parts of the experience to each other as well as to the whole. While these psychological schools are exclusive of and opposed to each other, yet they are merely extremes of what actually exists. There is a minimum level of learning in which associationism is operative and a maximum intellectual level at which explicit relationships predominate. An examination of experimental results will show this to be the case. The results of conditioned reflex experiments in both animals and man appear to show that there is present nothing beyond arbitrary linkage or bonding between the parts of the situation involved. On the other hand, one finds a certain degree of implicit meaning involved in perceptual situations—the level of animal achievement—as well as a certain measure of transfer of meaning. Explicit meanings may be related by means of word symbols involving the principle of the concept through the medium of speech, and this is only arrived at by human beings. We may regard these higher levels as “emergents” from the level of bonding or linkage.

CHILDREN'S PHANTASIES.

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It is generally admitted that during the first seven years of life the individual accomplishes a vast amount of mental as well as of physical development. He widens and extends his powers in every direction. From the helpless infant dependent for every need upon those around him, and able to make only the minimum of effort towards the satisfaction of his desires, to the energetic, romping, thinking, phantasying creature of the Kindergarten, there is an enormous gulf set, yet a gulf that has been traversed in the course of each individual's development.

How is all this work on the mental side achieved? In the past it has been customary to look upon children's development in either of two ways. Either taking our departure from a biological point of view, we may regard the child as possessing a number of inherited characteristics which must inevitably appear in the course of his development, modified but never eliminated by experience. Or, we may take the older view, namely, that of John Locke and the earlier psychologists, and regard the mind at birth as comparable to a *tabula rasa*, upon which the environment in the shape of sensory stimuli gradually imprints certain marks or "characters". This view regards development not as growth, but as a summation of chance elements gradually accumulating from the environment.

The "convergence" view of Wm. Stern attempts a combination of these two attitudes, and insists upon the idea of the development of personality as a more appropriate explanation. Thus both inner and outer forces are recognized. There is the deliberate "seeking" of the individual from birth for that which satisfies his needs, and at the same time is recognized the moulding effect of a resisting environment.

It seems that the whole problem of experience is related to the question of a developing contact with, and recognition of, reality. The child has from the first a will to live, which may possibly be better described as a will to develop. He seeks after and earnestly strives to obtain those things that are necessary to development, whether at the physiological, the emotional or the intellectual level. It is admitted he achieves a great deal. We find everywhere at the age of seven the *results*

of thought. The child of seven can not only use our spoken language, but can often read and write as well. Thus he has acquired already three sets of symbols, each of which he naturally still uses imperfectly, and soon begins to use some simple mathematical symbols too. In addition to all this, he has some knowledge of many elementary subjects, and a vast amount of interest in all practical matters and in mechanical appliances. So sure have most educators been that children acquire all this in a logical and intellectual way that the schools have for the most part in the past planned a curriculum of intellectualistic exercises.

It is no wonder, then, that the life of imagination or the phantasy world, which has always been recognized as peculiar to early childhood, should have presented a puzzle so great that it has usually been disregarded almost entirely, and has until recently received but scant consideration from psychologists and educationalists alike. Even one who has done so much for child education as Madam Maria Montessori, bases her system upon sense training and logical and systematic learning, leaving little room for imaginative work and play. When a child falls into a deep day-dream in the midst of his studies, he is still often regarded as wasting his time. In the old days he was called suddenly and unsparingly back to the task in hand, spelling maybe, or multiplication tables.

This attitude that regarded the phantasies of childhood as unimportant or positively unhealthy, left unexplained the most characteristic element in early experience. It is now recognized by psychologists that a child of five years can only concentrate in the way an adult concentrates for a very few minutes together. In all the rest of the time, what is he doing? He is playing, day-dreaming, moving with the rapidity and ease of dispersed attention from one subject to another apparently unrelated topic, taking out his store of ideas, looking as it were at his treasures, assimilating the new to the old. With so much to learn, so much to accomplish in order that he may, as we say, "be introduced as rapidly as possible to the culture of the age in which he lives", the child plays and day-dreams with the passing of the days. It seems there must be some secret power in phantasy itself which enables him to bring about his phenomenal development.

How shall we regard this question in the light of recent researches? There is the view that sees phantasy-like play as an exercise in preparation for real achievement. As the kitten plays with the ball of wool and so perfects those movements

that will later be used by the cat in overpowering its prey, so the child's games and dreams are regarded also as exercises in preparation for adult life. There is a good deal of truth in this view, but it becomes unsatisfactory when a rigorous or detailed application of it is attempted.

Another way of regarding the day-dream may be called the *compensation* view. Here the child, existing in a world altogether too difficult for him, too hard and cold for his fragile mind to grasp, turns away and finds consolation in his play and day-dreaming (harmless amusements enough!), awaiting the time when his mental and physical development will enable him to come into closer contact with reality. Childhood therefore is regarded as happy, carefree, irresponsible, with no need to face difficulties or grasp realities. There is in this view at least a toleration for rather than a condemnation of the day-dream, but still there is but slight appreciation alike of the real significance of imagination and of the capabilities of children.

The psycho-analytic point of view involves the recognition of the existence of certain unconscious trends that are continually seeking expression. So soon as the child wearies of his objective concern for environment, he becomes engrossed in pleasurable phantasies which embody in symbolic form these unconscious and sensual trends. Reality is difficult and unpleasant; therefore the child seeks the pleasurable, and retires, as it were, into himself. His attitude at these times is described as being narcissistic, involving love of self rather than love of any other object. In the phantasies themselves there is a tendency to regression to an earlier pleasurable phase of development rather than a progression to new experience. Development is regarded as involving a continual conflict between the reality and pleasure principles. There is also here recognition of the compensatory value of phantasy, but the psycho-analytic view is more comprehensive.

There are then two divergent explanations of the meaning of phantasy. On the one hand, it is conceived in every detail as a preparation for adult life; on the other, it implies a refusal for the time being to face reality. The resolution of this whole problem must lie in a direct study of the phantasies themselves.

Stern finds almost incomprehensible certain conflicting tendencies that are inherent in the imaginings of children. He discovers "a conspicuous chopping and changing of ideas", and at the same time an astonishing amount of perseveration. In illustration of the first of these, he describes the behaviour of his son one day at the age of four years when drawing

and talking to himself. Stern wishes to show how rapidly the mind goes from one subject to another and how little synthesis there is in the ideas. Gunther is requested to draw a camel. He begins, but is evidently not very interested in the camel, for his lively invention soon turns the drawing into a butterfly. He then proceeds to draw, in succession, another butterfly, a bird, a gnat, and at last a sun and a star. This is very like the performances observed in my own subjects. But is there here no factor of synthesis? The first object, namely, the camel, was not of his own choice and may therefore be disregarded. In all the rest it is possible to detect a dominant idea which led the child to draw just those objects one after the other. Certainty as to the exact nature of the dominant idea could only be arrived at with further knowledge of the context in the child's thoughts from which this example was taken. The suggestion about to be made is therefore based upon insufficient evidence to be conclusive, but may be useful as a suggestion nevertheless. This little boy had evidently reached the stage in drawing which stands between simple juxtaposition of the various items and the later stage in which there is the development of a picture and where the relation between the ideas is more correctly shown. In the pictures drawn by children of five or less the following characteristics are often found. The scene is sometimes of outdoor life. There is probably a house, trees, various figures about which the child entertains phantasies, and which vary according to the story or phase of the story that he is depicting. But in spite of much variety, each child seems to develop a more or less stereotyped series of adjuncts that complete every picture of that particular type. The outdoor scene is usually complete with a sun, or a moon, sometimes both together, almost invariably a bird or two, and, as a more modern element, an aeroplane. These objects seem to form a composite group in the child's mind. They belong for him to the regions above, are associated with ideas of the sky, Heaven, and so on. This situation cannot of course be analysed from a single drawing, but there seems to be in Stern's example a representation of that group of ideas associated with the sky, which were probably at a later period added to his outdoor pictures to complete the earthly scene with that of Heaven. So such flying creatures as a gnat, a butterfly, and a bird, together with the sun and a star, do surely show some synthesis, some definite perseverance in an idea, namely, the idea of things seen in the air above. This is in fact quite comprehensively illustrated, and constitutes the germ of a pictured scene. His conversation, quoted by Stern, shows that neither was the moon forgotten, but his

discretion avoided the mistake of including it along with the sunshine and the butterflies.¹

At every turn in studying young children we find this necessity of trying to perceive the child's own meaning. The symbolism often employed in children's thinking is an added difficulty, for we may either make the mistake of taking the words at their face value and finding no meaning in them, or we may possibly fall into the greater error of a false interpretation. For this reason it is necessary to collect as much material as possible, in each case associated phantasies, and current thoughts, as well as information concerning the child's circumstances, before an interpretation can be undertaken. Then taking an inherent unity in his ideas as hypothesis, attempt to find the way in which the various apparently scattered elements are related for him. But as well as this attempt to link together the elements into a total whole, it has also been possible in most of my cases to watch day by day a development in the individual phantasies themselves, and here again attempt to discover the meaning of the gradual change of content for the child.

No problem which a child ponders may be said to be unimportant to him. His thoughts may not be consciously directed towards the problem; directed thought is in a measure unnatural to young children. He does not ponder deliberately as we do, bringing our wandering thoughts definitely and surely back to the task, phantasy itself is apparently his instrument. I believe it to be the means by which the child overcomes environment, learns gradually to face reality, brings about mental development. Phantasy seems to be the very essence of primitive thinking, and in particular of the thinking during early childhood.

And yet even in adult life, have we left this method of thinking absolutely behind? Is there not a rhythm in thought which even in relation to a serious problem drops back now and again to a state of day-dreaming around it? And can we be sure that even in apparently idle phantasy we are not achieving on a lower plane something that may supplement adaptation in ways as yet unanalysed? There seems to be evidence of much obscure thinking that goes on even during sleep, over and beyond what is remembered as a dream, for a problem that has been unsolved at night is often clearer in the morning.

There is a rhythm in experience, the rhythm of concentrated and dispersed attention, of directed and undirected thought,

¹ Stern: "The Psychology of Early Childhood", p. 284.

of objective and subjective experience. It seems that the child in the attempt to satisfy his needs, intellectual as well as physical, adopts at first an objective attitude, making some contact with environment. This is followed immediately by a subjective retiring into phantasy. Like those simple animalculæ that stretch out long pseudopodia into the surrounding water in search of food, retiring afterwards into a state of apparent passivity while digestion takes place, so does the child seek experience and, having come in contact with reality, retire within himself to understand and consolidate what he has acquired. He cannot tackle a problem all at once, immediately, even such problems as seem insignificant to us. This is surely the meaning of childhood; time is needed for adaptation. With this oscillation between objective and subjective ways of thinking, the individual comes then, often in contact with reality, and supplements and corrects his subjective ideas, yet retires repeatedly within himself, and does the real work of thinking subjectively and alone. It seems highly probable that mental work ultimately tending towards adaptation goes on at all the levels of the mind, but the initial action of thought is started at the surface, and returns ever to objective contacts for correction, supplementation, and finally expression. As the reflex arc begins with a stimulus from environment and results in a reaction in relation to environment, so thought begins with a clash of the individual with reality, and returns again to the objective level to find expression. It is the process that takes place between these objective points that we try to study in investigating phantasy.

If this view is correct we should expect to find in any series of day-dreams a movement from a personal, subjective, generally ego-centric attitude, towards a more socialized, objective and *real-ized* attitude. In the phantasies collected during my London research this is indeed what is found. The child returns day by day to a problem, often inventing a story which constitutes a statement of the problem. Then in a series of stories which repeat the theme, his attitude to the subject matter is gradually modified, supplemented and corrected. Cross-sections only of this process could be observed even during the space of more than twenty successive days. The problems at this stage are very slowly resolved; difficulties are overcome throughout development. Problems at this stage are almost invariably of an emotional nature, often involving a question of social adjustment. Examples of this step-by-step process were found with most of the children in the original

stories; others tended to produce a series of dreams showing the development of thought at a lower level, whilst still others showed this development in a series of drawings, in which the same theme, modified from day to day, was produced. As examples one might mention the stories of Dick, whose problem related to that of possession, how to obtain those things in life that we need. For several days he makes his characters steal the fruit and other objects that they wish to acquire. From the fifth day on theft is punished. Later he pictures his people purchasing from others, or exchanging goods, usually fruit. Later still they procure seed and grow what they need in their gardens. There is here an obvious development of thought in relation to a quite important social problem. Then Hilda, through a series of phantasies, gradually brings herself from the attitude of helpless tears when toys are broken or lost to the attitude of self help that searches for the lost object or tries to repair the damage. Bert throughout a series of "bird phantasies", describes how a little bird (virtually himself) flies far across the sea, overcoming such difficulties as growing tired and having a broken wing. He pictures the bird flying to "a sunny country", resting on a ship, flying on again, escaping from many dangers, and finally reaching the land of his desire.

Many examples could be quoted showing the way in which these children develop their ideas in relation to a problem by a series of imagined and experimental solutions successively produced over a period of time. In studying these phenomena we appear to discover the function of phantasy. Let us consider the characteristics of the process employed.

In the first place the problem is not attacked in a direct way, but indirectly. The indirect method of the story is the favourite; the identity of the hero is thus disguised even from the author, as in dream thoughts. Another aspect of this indirectness is that of the frequent use of symbolism. There are varying degrees of this. In the phantasies of Dick, the apples, eggs and other objects, symbolize in turn the "desired". With Alfred, who betrayed fear of the country, of bulls, snakes and fishes, it is possible that his stories of the big fish possess also a deeper significance, and symbolize for him the fearful in general. The bird in Bert's stories is quite obviously himself.

Then it is clear also that the problem is not attacked all at once, but in a piecemeal fashion. The various conceived solutions arise in the mind one by one. They are not independent of each other, but grow stage by stage, using similar concepts, but generally developing an attitude from point to point. Thus there is an overlapping of ideas, some-

times elements in the first stage are retained to the end, others drop out at various stages, the inessentials being one by one discarded to make place for newer and more suitable ideas. Sometimes there is even an apparent juxtaposition, or seeming unrelatedness between successive stories, for although the causal argument is implied it is not expressed, the child neither possesses the means to this expression nor perceives the necessity for it.

There are probably also varying degrees of realization in the child's mind of what is happening. Some children seem to feel that they are solving a problem; usually, however, they are just telling stories, phantasying, with an only half-conscious realization of the direction of their thoughts. Further evidence appears in the fact that children often do not recognize their own stories or drawings two weeks after they produced them, even when they are associated with still continued phantasies. They represent an earlier phase that has been superseded. They have no longer any meaning for the subject. Concentration is upon one step at a time.

There is also a certain fluctuation in the movement of ideas from stage to stage. The development of the theme does not take place in a regularly progressive way, but there is occasionally a definite regression to, or recapitulation of, a previously held position. This is only another aspect of the general fact of a rhythm or oscillation qualifying all mental processes in childhood, and particularly the learning process. It can be observed in any mastery by children of new material. It is also related to the degree of consolidation achieved at the various stages, and is dependent upon the mental energy available and the law of span of attention.

There are, of course, individual differences. The child who is absorbed in a difficult problem (and there were several in the group) gives expression to this in all his imaginative work. It forms the subject matter of his dreams, of his drawings, his imagery reflects it, and it is the theme of his stories. In some cases the material is so complex that only a slight degree of development can be discerned during the space of time that they were studied. The movement here is relatively slow due to the difficulty of the problem. Such children appear lost in their phantasies. Those children whose energy is freer and whose attitude is more objective go rapidly from one problem to another, sometimes dealing with several alternately or with several aspects of the same problem using different sets of symbols. There is everywhere complexity, and it is only by isolating certain definite themes that the meaning of the various processes can be discovered.

Other individual differences relating to function have to do with the fact that some children express their ideas better in one medium, others in another. The story seems to be the favourite medium, but some children express themselves better in drawings, or show the development of thought in dreams or imagery.

Further differences in the degree to which we can observe this development of a theme are due to the intelligence level of the children. Thus very little development is noticed in several of the backward children. The process is so slow that several months at least would be required to provide sufficient material for a study of the exact methods adopted here. The most valuable material from the backward children was the drawings, for they had less command of verbal expression than their more intelligent fellows.

It has not been possible here either to enter into a description of the special technique used in collecting the imaginative material, nor yet to enter into the many problems that arose out of the study of the quite extensive material. I have been obliged to limit myself to one aspect of the problem, namely, that of function. The results are so far tentative and provisional with regard to function. I selected this aspect of the work because it is obviously the most fundamental question that arises. I hope before long myself to be in a position to throw further light upon it.

I will now summarize the tentative conclusions that were arrived at with regard to the function of phantasy in young children upon the basis of the intensive study of 30 five years old children of varying intelligence. Each child was studied individually and for a period of several weeks in each case.

CONCLUSIONS.

1. It appears evident that phantasy or imagination provides the normal means for the solution of problems of development in early childhood.

2. The problem is attacked indirectly, is often disguised by symbolism, and the subject is only vaguely aware of the end towards which he is striving.

3. The problem develops by means of a series of successively imagined solutions, which constitute a piecemeal and gradual resolution of the problem.

4. The result of the process is found both in an acquisition of information by the subject, and also in the more prominent feature of a change of mental attitude.

5. The change of attitude is usually from a personal subjective point of view to a more socialized and objective one.

WHAT IS THE BASIS OF POLITICAL OBEDIENCE?

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I WISH to discuss some of the interesting questions raised by Mr. Ball's stimulating article¹ on "The Basis of Political Obedience", and incidentally to criticize some of the positions maintained therein. As I propose to treat his article as a starting point, I will first give a brief statement of what I believe to be its main contentions.² The question Mr. Ball seeks to answer is: Does the obedience of the majority of citizens to the main body of the law in a modern democratic state rest on force or on free consent (or will)? Mr. Ball regards the direct evidence advanced in support of their contention by those who maintain the latter thesis as weighty but inconclusive (179-80). He admits that the obedience is not due to overt physical compulsion, but rejects the contention that therefore it rests on consent as taking "too naïve a view both of force and will" (180). The fact is that we must distinguish two kinds of force—"political force" and "economic pressure". These, Mr. Ball contends, "belong to the same order of compulsion" (186). In ordinary usage, the word 'force', he points out, "does not mean external force, but fear of a physical penalty". Consequently, he urges, we should say that obedience is compelled by force if it is "due to a physical fear to which a man will normally succumb", no matter whether the fear of legal penalties or of starvation by economic pressure, provided this pressure is not due to forces altogether beyond human control (179, 184). The mere fact of "formal consent" (which he admits) is of no significance if it is given only under the constraint of economic pressure (180, 181, 186). And that, Mr. Ball contends, is the case. The basis of political obedience, therefore, is the economic pressure exercised by the wealthy minority.

Mr. Ball's procedure of discussing, now the question whether the 'primary laws' rest on consent, and now obstacles to the expression of the majority will, makes it a little difficult to see the precise nature of the arguments he advances in

¹ In the last issue of this Journal (Vol. X, No. 3, Sept., 1932).

² In case anyone should read it first, I should perhaps point out that this summary must inevitably fail to give a just impression of the value of Mr. Ball's article, for it neglects altogether the most prominent feature of it—his discussion of contemporary political affairs.

support of this view. If I have understood him correctly, his main contentions, implied or explicit, are these: (1) The people do not genuinely will what they in fact support by their votes, because they would not vote for it if they had fuller knowledge of the situation (181-2). (2) They do not genuinely will what they "formally consent" to, because they would not consent to it were they not constrained by the economic power of the wealthy minority (181, 183, 185). (3) "The political will is overcome by economic power"; high finance sets narrow limits to the political power of parliament (182-4).

I agree with Mr. Ball that, before we are entitled to say that the basis of political obedience is either force or will, it is necessary to analyse the meaning of these terms. But in my opinion Mr. Ball does not carry his analysis far enough. My aim in this article is primarily to attempt a more thorough analysis of these terms.

In the quite strict sense, an individual is forced to do a thing only if, or in so far as, in Aristotle's phrase, "the moving principle is outside, the person compelled contributing nothing (Nic. Eth., 10b, 15). He must not in any sense will the act; he must not accept or acquiesce in it; if it is one in respect to which his will is called into play, he must actively resist to the limits of his powers, or at any rate so far as resistance has any chance of enabling him to avoid doing it. He must not decide to do it because he knows that, if he does not, he will be literally forced to do it; the immediate cause of the action must lie wholly outside him (in the sense of his will), and the agency which is said to force him must actually operate, not merely threaten to.

The typical instance of being literally forced is that in which the individual is treated as an inanimate body could be treated, *e.g.*, pushed through a window. But he may still be forced in the strictest sense, although the act is one which only an animate or only a rational being could perform. An obvious instance of the former kind is reflex action. The latter, however, is more important, for though it is not willed, it yet involves will. Look at the matter in this way. If I reveal a secret because my captors threaten to torture me if I do not (provided I am not so overcome by fear that I am incapable of making a choice), I am not strictly forced to reveal it. If I do so, I choose to do so rather than be, or run the risk of being, tortured. The act arises out of my will, though no doubt I would not have willed it if the circum-

stances had been different. But that is true of every act of will. The act is literally forced upon me only if my will is 'broken', my power of choice destroyed, either by torture or by real¹ fear thereof. So long as it is simply a question of 'I prefer to speak rather than endure more', I am not in the strict sense forced; I am forced only when I am so overcome by pain or real fear that I am no longer capable of choosing, preferring, or willing at all. I propose to speak of force in this strict sense as 'compulsion', and to say that the person who is thus forced is 'compelled'.

But we ordinarily use the term 'force' in a much looser sense, in which there is no clear opposition between force and will. In this sense we say that we are forced by any circumstance in the absence of which we would not have chosen to do as we did do. *E.g.*, the sinking of the *Lusitania* forced America into the war; a shower of rain forced me to take my umbrella; the sneer on his rival's face, or the derisive laughter of the spectators, forced him to run the risk; the memory of his friend forced him to make the attempt. Any circumstance under which the act is done can in this sense be said to force him to do the act. Now every act is done under circumstances. Consequently, in this sense, every act can be said to be forced upon the individual, an act to accomplish which we exert all our energies, no less than one against which we strive with all our might. If, then, force is used in this sense, it is meaningless to ask whether anything is founded on force or on will, for where force is used in this sense there is no opposition between force and will. Where I wish to use the term in this broad sense, without explaining that it is in this sense that I am using it, I shall print it in italics.

When Mr. Ball contends that the basis of political obedience is not will but force, he cannot be using the term force in either of these senses. He himself stresses the fact that he is not using it in the strict sense of compulsion, for though the State² does sometimes employ compulsion, as when the policeman arrests a resisting criminal, it is obvious that such compulsion does not explain the habitual obedience of the majority of citizens. Compulsion is incompatible with formal consent, and Mr. Ball admits that the majority of citizens formally consent to obey the main body of laws. Nor can he be using the term in the broad sense of *force*, for to say that anything rests not on will but on *force* is meaningless.

¹ The reason for this adjective will be indicated later.

² When I speak of 'the State' I mean, unless the context indicates otherwise, 'any modern democratic state'.

It is meaningless because, as we saw, there is no opposition between *force* and will. There is no opposition between them because every act of will is *forced* upon us. For every action is *forced* upon us if we would not have done it had the circumstances been different, and that is true of every act of will. To say, then, that the citizen is *forced* to obey means merely that it is only because of certain circumstances, either internal or external, that he chooses to obey; that if these circumstances were different, he would not choose to obey. The assertion is nothing more than a statement in special terms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

We might, with a view to making it significant to say that political obedience is based not on will but on *force*, attempt to narrow this conception. We might distinguish between the case in which we are *forced* by our own conception of what is best, and that in which we are *forced* by external factors, *e.g.*, fashion, and say that obedience is *forced* upon us by external factors. The distinction, however, is not fundamental, for it is only in virtue of our conception of what is best in the circumstances that external factors *force* us. We might narrow the conception in another way by excluding from the range of circumstances which we regard as *forcing* us what we may call 'natural' circumstances, whether internal or external. Strictly speaking, natural things, events and laws represent circumstances which *force* us, in that were they different we would not act as we do, *e.g.*, if water would not quench thirst I would not drink it. So you can say that the fact that it quenches thirst *forces* me to drink water. Again, I would not act as I do had I not the impulses, instincts, desires, which I have. So you may say that these *force* these acts upon me. We may then restrict the sphere of *force* by excluding all such natural circumstances which are not subject to the control of man. In that case, in order that a circumstance should be regarded as *forcing* us, it must be, or be due to, the will of an individual or group of individuals. This will restrict the range of acts which we can say are *forced* upon us—or at any rate the range of grounds which we can advance for saying that an act is *forced* upon us. But though this distinction is very important, there is still no opposition between *force* and will. We can still say of every act of will that it is *forced* upon us, provided we would not have chosen to do it but for some circumstance which either consists in, or is due to, the will of another.

Even if we thus restrict the meaning of the term *force*, then, it is insignificant to say that *force* is the basis of political

obedience. Our conclusion so far, therefore, is that the statement that force is the basis of political obedience is not true if we use the term in the sense of compulsion, and not significant if we use it in the sense of *force*. In what sense, then, must we use the term if it is to be both significant, and also possibly true, that political obedience is based on force?

With a view to answering this question, we may ask: In what sense are we using the term 'force', when we say that force is the differentia of the State, or that all acts which are required by law are forced upon us? For it is clear that when we make these assertions we cannot be using the term either in the strict sense of compulsion or in the broad sense of *force*. (Force when used in this sense I shall write as **FORCE**¹.) We are using it in a wider sense than compulsion, and a narrower sense than *force*, a sense in which it has certain features of each of these. Like *force*, it normally acts on and through the will of the individual who is said to be forced. Thus, though the state **FORCES** me to pay my income tax, the policeman does not come and tear from my resisting hands a portion of my salary. I voluntarily write a cheque. It may be the case that I do so only because I prefer to do this rather than suffer the penalties which would otherwise be inflicted upon me. If so, the threatened penalty represents a special circumstance under which I choose to act in a certain way. You can say the act is not willed but forced, only in the sense that I would not have willed it had the circumstances been different. But, as you can say the same of any act of will, your statement can be distinctive only because the circumstance is peculiar. (I will develop this point in a moment.) If the circumstance were not peculiar, you would be forced only in the sense of *forced*, i.e., **FORCE** would be indistinguishable from *force*. But the act may not be forced, as opposed to willed, even in this sense. The circumstance that the State would otherwise inflict a penalty may have no bearing on my act. I may desire to make my proper contribution towards the work of the State, and would contribute even if the State did not threaten penalties if I did not. In this case I am both **FORCED** to, and also desire to, pay my taxes. The threatened penalty here does not represent a significant circumstance

¹ I am therefore employing the following means of indicating the sense of force under discussion. When the sense either is not specified, or else is specified by a qualifying clause, I shall write 'force'; where I am dealing with force in the strict sense I shall use the term 'compulsion'; when I am using force in the broad sense I shall write '*force*'; when I am using the term in the sense in which force is the differentia of the State I shall write '**FORCE**'.

under which I pay. The FORCE exercised by the State, then, is like *force* in that it is not necessarily opposed to will.

Nevertheless, acts which are required by law are forced upon me in a sense in which we cannot say that every act of will is forced upon me. Though, from one point of view, the fact that it is enjoined by law subject to penalty only represents a circumstance, and perhaps not a significant circumstance, under which I will the act, nevertheless this circumstance is distinctive. It distinguishes this (and similar) acts from all others, and connects FORCE with force in the strict sense of compulsion. In what respects, then, is this circumstance distinctive? Why is FORCE distinct from *force* and more akin to compulsion, despite the fact that the State usually acts on and through the will of those whom it FORCES? What are the peculiar conditions which it satisfies in virtue of which the State can be said to exercise FORCE as opposed to *force*? It is the fact that the law will, if necessary, be backed by force in the strict sense of compulsion; if we do not choose to do as the law enjoins, we will be compelled to. This is the only condition under which a power which does not exercise compulsion, but acts on and through a person's will, can be said in any distinctive sense to force that person; the only sense in which an agent who formally consents to do a thing can be said in any distinctive sense to be forced to do it.

We can, then, say that an act is FORCED upon us, despite the fact that we choose to do it (or formally consent to it), provided, if we did not choose to do it, we would certainly be compelled to do it, not by natural forces, but by the willed action of another individual or individuals. I add the last qualification because I agree with Mr. Ball (184) that there is no point in saying that we are compelled by natural forces.

But the fact that the State thus exercises FORCE does not necessarily imply that the State is founded on FORCE, or that FORCE is the explanation of the habitual obedience of the majority of its citizens. It would still exercise FORCE even if it were founded on will, *i.e.*, if the majority of citizens normally obeyed because they willed to do so. Consequently, the fact that the State exercises FORCE leaves entirely open the question as to whether the State is founded on force or will. On the other hand: (1) the State could be founded on FORCE,¹ and would be, if the citizens chose to obey the laws only because they knew that if they did not they would be com-

¹Or, if you wish to be precise, on the power which exercises this FORCE.

pelled to; (2) it must be founded on FORCE if it is founded on force at all. For, as we saw, it is not based on compulsion, but wins formal consent. But, we also saw, if anything is not based on compulsion but wins formal consent, then it is based on force in any distinctive sense only if the agent knows that he would be compelled if he did not consent, *i.e.*, only if it rests on FORCE. We would be justified in concluding that the State is founded on force in the sense of FORCE, then, if and only if we could show that it is not because they will to do so, but only because they know that if they did not they would be compelled to, that the majority of citizens choose to obey most laws. Consequently, what Mr. Ball would have to show, in order to prove that force (in the sense of FORCE) is the basis of political obedience is, either (*a*) that the citizens do not willingly obey the laws, or (*b*) that, though they choose to obey, they do so only because they know that if they did not they would be compelled to, not by natural forces, but by the will of men.

We are now ready to examine Mr. Ball's position so far as it is stated in terms of force. We may start with his definition of force as "fear of a physical penalty" and his contention that "obedience is produced by force when it is due to a physical fear to which a man will normally succumb" (179).

Several of the terms here used call for comment, and first the term 'fear'. We ordinarily use this term very loosely. We use it both as a noun and as a verb. Used as a noun, it stands for a certain kind of emotion. Used as a verb, it means to experience this emotion with reference to a certain object. Strictly speaking, I fear the object only while I am actually experiencing this emotion. In practice, however, we extend the use of the term. (1) We say that we fear an object, and speak of our fear of the object, even when we are not feeling the emotion at all, provided that in appropriate circumstances we would feel it with reference to that object. Thus, if we say that most men fear death, we do not mean that everyone is experiencing this emotion with reference to this object; at most we mean only that they would experience the emotion if death seemed imminent. Here you might say that though you have not actual, you do have potential, fear. (2) But we use the term even more broadly, where we cannot even speak of potential fear. The extension seems to come about in this way. Where I potentially fear an object, this fear manifests itself as an effort to avoid the object. To say that I act in a certain way through fear of the object, means that I act in

this way in order to avoid bringing the object into that relation to myself in which I would actually fear it; or, in the most general terms, I act in this way in order to avoid something which I regard as undesirable. Here what I regard as undesirable is a situation which would actually arouse fear. But we extend our use of the term fear to cover as well cases in which that which I regard as undesirable, and seek to avoid, is not a situation which would actually arouse fear. In other words, we say that I act in a certain way through fear of something, whenever I so act in order to avoid that thing, even though I would not under any circumstances actually fear it.¹ (We might speak of this as figurative fear.) Here, to say that I fear the thing, means simply that I regard it as undesirable, but liable to occur; to say that I act in a certain way through fear of it, means that I act as I do only because I think that if I acted otherwise this undesirable result would eventuate; that I prefer to act as I would otherwise not act, so as not to bring about this undesirable result. We can therefore say that I acted through fear of something, whenever it is true that I would not have acted as I did had I not thought that, if I acted otherwise, I would bring about something which I prefer to avoid, *i.e.*, whenever my reason for making a certain choice is the desire to avoid something which I think likely to occur if I choose otherwise. That means that it is natural to speak in this way whenever our aim is primarily to avoid a certain result, and it is permissible to speak in this way in regard to any act of choice, because we can always say that we act to avoid the non-accomplishment of that which we seek to accomplish.

Now, Mr. Ball, so far as I can see, is committed, in regard to his definition of force, to this broadest or figurative sense of the term 'fear'. For I gather that he contends that, at the recent election, the electors of Great Britain rejected Labour candidates through fear of a greater reduction in the standard of living than the depression made inevitable. Now it may be true that everyone implicitly fears starvation, but it would be absurd to say that the majority of British electors implicitly fear a greater reduction in the standard of living. Mr. Ball's contention clearly means simply that they preferred to accept a small reduction in the standard of living rather than, by rejecting it, to run the risk of a larger reduction. In popular parlance, they chose what they regarded as the less of two evils; or, looking at it from the other side, of two alternatives

¹ We may even refuse an invitation which we do not wish to accept in the form "I fear we will not be able to accept".

they chose the one which, all things considered, they regarded as preferable. But it is obvious that you can say this of any choice. Mr. Ball, therefore, is using 'fear' in that broad or figurative sense in which, in regard to any willed action, you can say that you acted as you did because you feared the alternative course. Consequently, if using fear in this sense you define force in terms of fear, then, unless you introduce qualifications, you will have to say that every act of will is forced upon you. You cannot oppose force and will, and so obviously cannot ask whether force or will is the explanation of political obligations. Defined simply in terms of figurative fear, force has no distinctive or useful meaning. Mr. Ball, however, does introduce a qualification. Does this qualification enable him so to restrict its meaning as to make the statement that the State rests not on will but on force significant? The qualification is that the fear must be "of a physical penalty . . . to which a man will normally succumb" (179).

By 'penalty' Mr. Ball cannot mean merely a legal penalty, for the context implies that "starvation by economic pressure" is a penalty no less than imprisonment. Penalty here means an undesirable consequence of an action; it is irrelevant how this consequence is brought about, whether by the State, by nature, by public opinion, or by economic pressure. The only qualification is that the consequence must be physical. It is difficult to see the precise import of this qualification. For imprisonment is obviously regarded as an instance of a physical penalty. Yet it is surely primarily, if not solely, on account of its psychical concomitants that imprisonment is undesirable. I take it, therefore, that the qualification is merely meant to exclude undesirable consequences, such as an uneasy conscience, which are not and cannot be brought about by physical means. If that is so, a ruined digestion, or being cut by one's friends, or looked down upon by one's acquaintances, would be physical penalties no less than imprisonment or starvation.

By a physical fear I presume Mr. Ball means the fear of a physical penalty. The phrase "to which a man will normally succumb" here simply indicates that the action can be said to be forced, only if it is such as a man would normally do in those circumstances. It may be said that this unduly weakens the force of the word "succumb". This word can have its full force, however, only if we are concerned with actual fear. And we are not; for it would be absurd to suggest that the majority of citizens are perpetually overcome by actual fear. To act from fear of a physical penalty to

which a man will normally succumb, then, means to choose to act in a certain way in order to avoid an undesirable consequence, of the kind which can be brought about by physical means, which we would expect to result from the alternative line of action, and to do so in circumstances in which a man would normally so choose. These qualifications do restrict the range of willed actions which we can say are forced on us. They exclude (a) those which we do from a sense of duty or to avoid the pain of a troubled conscience; (b) those which the normal man would not in the circumstances normally do. Nevertheless, the range of actions included still remains far too wide to enable us to give any distinctive meaning to the term 'force'. The dyspeptic's choice of dishes, and the sensitive person's behaviour in the presence of his fellows, will be due to force, no less than my payment of my income tax.

The consequence is that, even if we allow that his definition of force in terms of fear of a physical penalty entitles him to maintain that political obedience rests on force, that contention has no distinctive meaning, for force, so understood, cannot be opposed to will. But as a matter of fact, he has not proved that obedience does rest on force as thus defined. Indeed, it will not do so if or so far as citizens obey out of a sense of duty, and not merely to avoid the undesirable consequences of disobedience. If, or so far as, there are citizens who have the same attitude to the laws as Socrates, Mr. Ball's account of obedience in terms of force, defined as fear of a physical penalty, is at once too narrow and too wide—too narrow in that it ignores the citizen's conviction that he ought to obey, and yet still too wide to have any distinctive meaning.

Strictly speaking, fear forces a man only where it paralyses or destroys his will. This is possible only with actual fear; it is not possible with either potential or figurative fear. If we are to maintain in any distinctive sense that we are forced by that which we fear only potentially or figuratively, the conditions which we previously mentioned must be satisfied, *viz.*, we must know that if we do not voluntarily act in this way we will inevitably be compelled to, not by natural forces but by man. That is to say, the introduction of the conception of fear does not really further his argument at all. To prove that obedience rests on force, he still has to show, either (a) that the citizens do not willingly obey the laws, or (b) that though they formally consent to obey, nevertheless they do so only because they know that if they did not they would inevitably be compelled to do so, not by natural forces, but by the willed action of other men. To

justify his contention that the force in question is the economic pressure exercised by the wealthy minority, he must establish the latter point, *i.e.* (b), and show further that the willed action of other men referred to is the action of the wealthy minority directed towards economic ends.

Do the arguments Mr. Ball advances in support of his thesis prove these points? As his first argument (as given in my summary) seeks to show that obedience does not rest on consent, the second and third that it rests on force, it will be convenient to begin with the second argument, which states that 'the people do not genuinely will what they formally consent to, because they would not consent to it were they not constrained by the economic pressure of the wealthy minority'.

The first point to note is that I may be constrained to act in a certain way, and yet not forced to do so except in that broad sense of the term (= *forced*), in which we can say of any willed action that it is forced upon us. For we can say that we are constrained by any circumstance, in respect to which it is true that but for it we would not have acted as we did. And, as we saw in discussing force, that is true of every willed action. Consequently, merely to say that citizens are constrained to obey, would tell us nothing specific as to the basis of political obedience. The fact that they are constrained does not of itself show that they do not willingly obey the law. To add that it is by the wealthy minority that they are constrained, still does not entitle us to say that the State is founded on force in any specific sense, unless by constraint we mean force in a specific sense. For the fact that they are constrained by the wealthy minority does not necessarily imply that they do not willingly obey. As it is clear (as Mr. Ball admits) that the minority do not compel the majority to obey, the only specific sense in which they can force them to is the sense in which the State forces the majority of citizens to obey the laws, *i.e.*, they can only **FORCE** them to obey. But to show that obedience is based on **FORCE** we have to show that the second condition mentioned above is satisfied (namely that they choose to obey only because they know that if they did not they would be compelled to, not by natural forces, but by the willed action of men). But that means that Mr. Ball's second argument, instead of proving that that condition is satisfied, must presuppose it, if it is to have any specific meaning.

On the other hand, if it is true, even in the broadest sense of the word, that the citizens are constrained by the wealthy

minority, this represents an important point in regard to the conditions under which they consent to maintain the State. But there seems no reason to think that it is true. It is true only if it is the case that but for the pressure of the wealthy minority, the majority would not obey, *i.e.*, there would be no State. (For, if the majority ceased to obey, the State would be destroyed.) All the evidence seems to be against the view that but for the power of the wealthy minority there would be no State. Developed social life seems to require for its existence the type of organization which constitutes a society a State.¹ The most that it seems even plausible to maintain is that it is the power of the wealthy which determines the form of the State—the nature of the laws it enforces. And that, I think, is Mr. Ball's third argument.

This argument stated that: "The political will is overcome by economic power"; high finance sets narrow limits to the political power of parliament.' This, of course, could be taken to mean that the political will aims at the destruction of the State, but is prevented from achieving its end by economic power. This, however, is not Mr. Ball's meaning. He means that parliament is prevented by high finance from placing on the statute-book some of the laws which the majority of the electors desire to see there. But even if this is the case, that only means that economic power determines to some extent the nature of the law enforced by the State; it does not mean that it determines whether or not the State shall exist at all, but only that it determines to some extent the form which the State takes. Now it is obvious that the majority may continue to will the existence of the State, *i.e.*, may willingly obey the majority of the laws, despite the fact that the State is compelled by high finance to enforce certain laws of which they do not approve. The fact (if it is such) that high finance restricts the power of parliament would be sufficient to prove that the State is founded on the economic power of the wealthy, only if it could be shown that the majority of citizens do not willingly obey the main body of the laws. Again, the fact that the power of parliament is restricted by high finance does not necessarily imply that the State is compelled to enforce certain laws of which the majority do not approve. The majority may approve of the laws which high finance compels parliament to enforce, or disapprove of those which it prevents parliament from

¹ Though not necessarily, of course, a modern democratic state. By a State in this connection I mean a centrally organized society, exercising FORCE. Cf. Maciver: 'Community', p. 32.

enforcing.¹ Further, even if the majority do not approve of the laws which result from the restriction of parliament's power by high finance, they may approve of that restriction on the powers of parliament. To take a concrete instance, it seems reasonable to infer from the results of recent elections in Britain and Australia that the majority of the electors in those countries believed (whether rightly or wrongly is irrelevant to my point) that it was desirable that the power of parliament should be restricted by high finance, or at any rate by what high finance regards as sound financial principles. If, or so long as, the people will that the power of parliament should be so restricted, this restriction does not limit, but is an expression of, the will of the people.²

Again, if I may be permitted a short digression, I believe, though I cannot prove, that it is only within comparatively narrow limits that the wealthy minority do determine the nature or form of the State or of the laws it enforces. I believe that a far more potent factor in this respect is the economic attitude of the vast majority of the people—the desire of private gain, aggrandizement, power—and the dominating part it plays in their lives. The pressure of the wealthy minority is in my opinion only one manifestation of this all but universal attitude, and is made possible only by this attitude.

Be that as it may, the fact that the power of parliament is limited by high finance does not prove that this represents a restriction of the will of the people, unless we can show that the people are not willing that parliament's powers should be so limited; and even if it does represent a restriction of the will of the people, that does not prove that the power which imposes this restriction (high finance) is the foundation of the State, or the key to political obedience; it does not even prove that the State is not founded on the will of the people, unless we can show that the people accept only unwillingly, not merely the laws which result from those restrictions, but also the main body of laws. We can only conclude, then, that the two arguments we have so far considered do not enable Mr. Ball to advance a single step towards proving his conclusion.

The remaining argument maintains that 'the people do not genuinely will what they in fact support by their votes, because they would not vote for it if they had fuller knowledge

¹ This of course implies that the majority of the electors do not support this part of the government's policy.

² The question, whether it is only because they are deluded that they will it, will be considered later.

of the situation'. It admits that the State rests on "formal consent", but it maintains that this formal consent is given only on account of ignorance, and so does not represent the genuine will of those consenting.

The distinction which Mr. Ball is here making is both necessary and fundamental, though it is difficult to state it in a way which is not open to misunderstanding. He is in effect pointing out that we must distinguish between what a person is in fact actually doing, on the one hand, and what he intends to do, and believes he is doing, on the other. For instance, a man may act in a certain way with a view to furthering the interests of a friend whom he desires to assist, and may believe that in so acting he is achieving his aim, and yet in fact his action may have precisely the opposite effect, so that anyone who judged from the effect alone would think that he was seeking to harm his friend. I propose to speak of what the person intends to do or accomplish, and believes he is doing or accomplishing, as his genuine will, and of what he in fact does, or sets about doing, as his apparent will.¹ The term 'apparent' seems appropriate because this is what he would appear to an outsider to will, and is something, though not what it appears to be. It is, I think, less misleading than the term 'actual', which is usually employed in this connection. This suggests that the genuine will is not actual, but a mere ideal or vain product of the imagination, which has no factual existence—what I ought to will, perhaps, but in fact do not—and so that the only will which has any real existence, or is more than an idle dream, is what I have called the apparent will.

The suggestion, however, is totally unjustified. It is true that the apparent will is actual in the sense that it is actually manifest in action, whereas the genuine will,² in that it is not thus manifest in action, is not actual, but only ideal. It is true also that this manifestation is brought about as the result of the agent's own decision or choice, by his own hand and energy, and represents what he believes he wills; whereas his genuine will does not determine his choice or evoke a decision, does not call forth an expenditure of energy, does not issue in action, and is not recognized by the agent as what

¹ It is convenient to speak of the apparent will, though perhaps my position would be less liable to be misunderstood if, instead of 'apparent will', I wrote 'what he appears to will'. This expression, unlike the other, could hardly be taken to imply that I mean to assert that a person has two wills. Anyone, however, who is prepared to accept the word 'appearance' instead of 'what the objects appears as' is not entitled to object to the use of 'apparent will' instead of 'what he appears to will'.

² So far, that is, as the apparent will fails to coincide with it. Where they coincide the distinction is not required.

he wills. Yet, despite all this, the suggestion that the apparent will is alone actual, the genuine will a mere ideal or idle dream, is totally unjustified. There would be more reason for saying precisely the opposite. For the apparent will is not actual but a mere ideal, in the sense that it is what the agent would will if the objective conditions were such as he takes them to be, but in fact are not; but is not what he wills under the actually existing objective conditions, though he thinks it is. Though it is actual as an event, this event is not the actualization of his will under the given objective conditions, despite the fact that he believes it is. The genuine will, on the other hand, is not ideal but actual, in the sense that it is what the agent wills, not under certain ideal objective conditions, but under the objective conditions which actually exist, though he is not aware that they do. The position, then, is this. Though the apparent will is actual in the sense that it is actually manifest in action, it is not actual but ideal in the sense that, despite the fact that it is chosen by the agent, it is not what he wills under the actually existing objective conditions, but what he would will under certain ideal¹ or imaginary conditions. The genuine will, on the contrary, though ideal in the sense that it is not manifest in action, is actual in the sense that it is what the agent wills under the actually existing conditions. Now in each case it is the latter sense which, in the present connection, is important, for this refers to the will itself, the former only to its external manifestation. In short, the genuine will is what he actually *wills*, the apparent will what he actually (but mistakenly) *chooses as the manifestation* of his will.

We may be told that we seem to have justified this conclusion only because, when speaking of the actually existing objective conditions under which the agent wills, we neglected the really vital condition, namely, the fact that he is ignorant of some relevant material circumstance. When we take this circumstance into account (so it may be said), it is obvious that it is not the genuine will, but the apparent will, which represents what he wills under the actually existing conditions.

It is true that the discrepancy between the apparent will and the genuine will occurs only when the agent is ignorant of some relevant material circumstance; true also that his ignorance is vital in determining his choice and action. Nevertheless, it is not an objective condition under

¹ I am using 'ideal' in the broad sense in which it is equivalent to 'not actual', without any implication that this is obligatory or more valuable than the actual.

which he wills. It does not represent part of the situation to which he is called upon to respond, but merely that which causes him to misconceive that situation. It is true, therefore, that it determines his conception of what he wills, and so also his choice and action. But the question is not what he thinks he wills, but what he does will. What he thinks he wills no more determines what he does will than the punter's tip determines the winner.

This reply, however, may call forth a further objection. It may be said that our supposition that a man may not will what he thinks he wills is false; he cannot but be aware of what he wills, and so will necessarily will what he thinks he wills.

This objection really involves two contentions: (1) that a man cannot will anything without being aware that he does so; (2) that what a man thinks he wills is necessarily what he does will. I admit that if either contention is true (and the second may be true even though the first is false), then our distinction between the genuine will and the apparent will (to which Mr. Ball also is committed) is not justified. But I believe, and wish to try to show, that both contentions are false.

Let us take first the contention that you cannot will anything without being aware that you do so. Two points suffice to refute it. (1) A man may be fully cognizant of the end he wishes to attain, despite the fact that, with a view to attaining it, he acts in a way other than that in which he would have acted had he been better informed. That is to say, he is aware of the end, despite his ignorance of the means (or best means) of attaining it. Consequently the objector must admit that he wills the end. But, in willing the end, he wills the necessary means thereto. (2) It is not true that you cannot will a thing without being aware that you will it. It is necessary to distinguish between what we may call 'noticed' and 'unnoticed' will. Perhaps the most obvious instances of unnoticed will are our habits. Though we are usually quite unaware that we will actions which have become habitual, we have not, as a rule, ceased to do so; we have only ceased to notice that we do so. If we ceased to will them, they would cease to be habitual. We still will them, but because the will meets with no resistance or obstacles, we do not notice it. We notice it only when obstacles or difficulties are met with. Unless you use the term in a wider sense than is customary, however, habit does not exhaust the unnoticed will. Most of the activity which occurs naturally in virtue of our inherited

dispositions or instincts is willed, but so long as it proceeds without hindrance we do not as a rule notice that we will it. The 'will to live' is as a rule unnoticed, but none the less real; we will the satisfaction of our social impulse (or herd instinct), but seldom notice that we do; and so on. The fact, then, that we do a thing naturally or as a matter of course, does not mean that we do not will it, but only that the will is unnoticed; you may will a thing without being aware that you do so.

We come, then, to the contention that what a man thinks he wills is necessarily what he does will. In view of the fact that it is not ordinarily true that what a person thinks is the case necessarily is the case, it would be reasonable to place on the objector the onus of proving that it is true in this case. We can see, however, that it is not true, if we consider what it is that a man wills. He wills the good. For the good is that which would satisfy his needs or realize his nature, and to will is to strive to satisfy one's needs or realize one's nature. Consequently, it is obvious that what he wills is the satisfaction of his needs, *i.e.*, the good, or attainment of the good. If, however, he is under a misapprehension as to what will satisfy his needs, or as to the nature of the objects available for satisfying them, he will choose as a means of satisfying those needs, that which will not in fact satisfy them. What he thus chooses, however, will not represent what he wills, but only what he thinks he wills. For what he wills is the good or what will satisfy his needs; he does not will anything which will not satisfy them, though he will think he wills anything which he thinks will satisfy them. Consequently what he thinks he wills will differ from what he does will, whenever he is ignorant as to what will satisfy his needs, or as to the nature of the objects available for satisfying them.

The suggestion that the genuine will is what we ought to will but in fact do not is misleading. What is true is that the genuine will represents what we ought to choose but in fact do not. For to say that a man ought, means that he must, in order to realize his nature or be himself, and this, as we saw, is what he (genuinely) wills. Consequently, what he genuinely wills is what he ought to choose. But even this, though true, is not relevant, for it does not represent the ground on which we distinguish between the genuine and the apparent will, but merely a further fact in regard to the genuine will.

We must conclude, then, that the distinction between the genuine will and the apparent will, which Mr. Ball's criticism of formal consent implies, is valid. He is justified in main-

taining that the people do not genuinely will what they in fact support by their votes, if they vote thus only because they are ignorant. He is justified in doing so because, whenever the agent chooses as he does only because he is ignorant of some relevant material circumstance, his apparent will is discrepant from his genuine will. When, however, we go on to examine more closely the distinction between them, as we must if we are to determine whether the State rests on the genuine will of the people, we find that it is not so simple as we have so far assumed. We have so far assumed that we are presented with a certain situation, a single feature of which requires to be modified in one particular way, if our needs are to be satisfied; our contention being that this modification is what we genuinely will, whereas, if through ignorance we choose to modify it in some other way, this choice represents only our apparent will. But the situation may be such that, however we modify this feature, our needs will still remain unsatisfied, though if we act in one way we will attain greater satisfaction than if we act in another. We can meet this difficulty by saying that what in any given circumstances we genuinely will is what is best in those circumstances. Here, however, we are still assuming that one feature of the situation only is modifiable, all the other features being fixed and unalterable conditions under which this one is to be modified. It is clear, however, that this will not always be the case. Frequently other features also can be modified. Whether we can modify them will depend in last resort on the extent of our knowledge. Any of these features can be treated either as modifiable, or as conditions under which other modifiable features are to be modified. What is best under the given conditions, when these features are treated as conditions, may not be best, under what would then be the given conditions, if they were treated as modifiable features. Further, where this occurs, what would be best under the latter conditions would be better than what would be best under the former conditions. Consequently, so far as we can regard certain features, either as themselves modifiable, or as conditions under which other features are modifiable, we can interpret the term 'genuine will' with varying degrees of strictness, or take it at different levels.

Perhaps a symbolic illustration will make the position clearer. In our previous discussion we were assuming that we were faced with a situation which we may symbolize as ABCDE, and the problem was to modify C as is best under the given conditions ABDE. But B and D may also be modifiable. What would be best where ABDE are treated as conditions

under which C is to be modified, may not be best where AE are treated as conditions under which BCD are to be modified. For the modification of B and D also may enable us to achieve a better result than the modification of C only would. In that case, we will more genuinely will what is best where AE are treated as conditions under which BCD are to be modified, than what is best where ABDE are treated as conditions under which C is to be modified; the former will represent a higher level of the will than the latter.

It is perhaps useful to distinguish three such levels, though no doubt an indefinite number could be distinguished. At the first level, one feature of a given situation is treated as modifiable, the rest being treated as fixed conditions under which this is modifiable. Here what we genuinely will is what, under these conditions, is best and would be chosen had we adequate knowledge. At this level, the ignorance and prejudices of others, for instance, might be treated simply as conditions under which we are called upon to act, and not as being themselves subject to modification by our action. The genuine will at this level, however, is open to criticism on the ground that what we really will is not to act as would be best if all features of the given situation save one were unalterable conditions under which we had to act, but to act as is best under the conditions which remain when all features which we can modify are treated as modifiable. This criticism advances us to the second level, at which all features of the situation we know how to modify are treated as modifiable, only those which we do not know how to modify being regarded as the conditions under which these are to be modified. Here what we genuinely will is what is best under these conditions. At this stage we would regard the ignorance and prejudices of people, not as a condition under which we have to act, but as something to be overcome and removed. Natural laws and natural phenomena which we do not know how to modify, on the other hand, would represent conditions under which we have to act. The genuine will at this level, however, is still open to criticism on the ground that what is best under these conditions would not be best under the conditions which would remain if such of these conditions as are modifiable (though we do not know how to modify them) were treated as modifiable. At this level all features of the situation which are modifiable are to be treated as such, only those which even omniscience would not enable us to modify being treated as conditions under which these are to be modified. Here what we genuinely will is what would be best under these conditions. Naturally we can form no conception of what we will at this

level, as opposed to what we will at the previous level. Nevertheless: (1) this third level is merely the conception of the genuine will pushed to its logical conclusion. You are committed to it from the time that you admit that, if a person does a certain thing only because he is ignorant of some relevant material circumstance, then he does not genuinely will that which he does. (2) Even at this level, the genuine will is still real or actual. We will not merely the best we know, but *the* best, though we do not know how it is to be attained, or what it would be like if attained. (3) What is best under certain conditions is *the* best so far as it can be realized under these conditions. Consequently, what we genuinely will at the lower levels is what we genuinely will at the third level, so far as it can be realized under the conditions operative at these levels.

We are now in a position to consider whether it is true, as Mr. Ball contends, that the majority of the people "formally consent" to the existence and laws of the State only because they are ignorant; or, in other words, whether it is true that, though they apparently, they do not genuinely will to maintain the State and obey its laws. What we have to ask, then, is whether, at each of the two levels of the genuine will which we are competent to discuss, the State's existence and laws are genuinely willed by the majority of its citizens. That means that we have to consider whether the State and its laws represent what is best under the conditions operative at each level.

Let us start with the second level. Here the question is: If every feature of the universe which we know how to modify were modified for the best so far as we know how, would it be best, under the conditions then operative, that the State¹ should exist and enforce its laws? In last resort it comes to this: Even if under present conditions we cannot dispense with the State, do we know how to effect such improvements in man's nature and environment as to render the existence of the State unnecessary or undesirable? Or, on the contrary, is the existence of the State, so far as we can see, absolutely essential to the satisfaction of man's needs? I maintain that the latter is the case. For I believe that a centrally organized society exercising FORCE, that is a State, is essential for the satisfaction of man's want or the realization of his nature. Without it there could be no highly organized social life, and

¹ I do not here mean to restrict 'the State' to states of the form with which we are familiar, *e.g.*, modern democratic States. As indicated lower down, I mean the term to be interpreted widely enough to apply to any centrally organized society exercising FORCE, no matter what the mode of organization or its extent. It might be world-wide.

without this the individual could not realize himself. To attempt to justify this belief would take me too far afield, and lengthen unduly an already all too lengthy article. But I think I may reasonably claim that, in view of the evidence of history, psychology, political thought and ordinary experience, the onus of proving that the belief is unsound rests on its critics.

Even at this level, then, the people genuinely will the existence of the State. It does not follow, however, that they also will that it should have even the same general form, let alone that it should enforce precisely, or even in the main, the same laws, as at present. Indeed, there can be little doubt that a State which had the form, and enforced the laws, which at this level the people genuinely will, would not be recognized by the political realist as a State—that it would be one. In any case, it is certain that the people do not at this level genuinely will that the State should have the specific form it now has, or that many of its laws should remain on the statute-book. That, however, does *not* mean that they do not, even at this level, genuinely will to obey these laws so long as they do remain on the statute-book. For, in willing the existence of the State, they necessarily will whatever is essential for its maintenance. Subject to one proviso, that includes obedience to all its laws. For the State would be destroyed if its citizens ceased to obey its laws. Consequently, to disobey a law is to take a step which, if generalized, would destroy the State. Consequently he who wills the existence of the State must will to obey its laws, unless (and this is the proviso referred to above) there are any which are such that, in respect to them, obedience is more detrimental to the existence of the State than disobedience. If the State does enforce any such laws, he who wills the existence of the State must will to disobey them. For instance, if war would certainly destroy the State, the person who willed its existence would, if he understood the situation, be a conscientious objector. If, on the other hand, war was essential to its continued existence, then he who willed its existence would necessarily will to do his part in prosecuting the war. Subject to this proviso, then, though the people no doubt do not at this level genuinely will that all the laws which are on the statute-book should be there, they do, even at this level, genuinely will to obey them all so long as they are there.¹

¹ This must not, of course, be taken to imply that in the case of every (or even any) actual state, past or present, the majority of its citizens genuinely will to obey most of its specific laws. In some (or even all) cases, the proviso may possibly apply to more laws than the general principle. The laws enforced may be so bad that, in the case of the majority of them, disobedience may be less detrimental to the existence of the State than obedience.

When we take the genuine will at the first level, our question is whether, treating everything but the State and its laws as unalterable conditions, under these conditions it is best that the State should exist and enforce its laws. I take it that it will generally be conceded that under these conditions, not only is it best that the State should exist, but also that its form and laws should approximate more closely to its present form and laws than would be best where these conditions were modified for the better. In other words, the people at this level genuinely will that the State should continue to exist in more nearly its present form, and retain more of its present laws. These are best under the conditions here operative, despite the fact that it would be better if some of these conditions were altered, in which case many of these laws would no longer be best under the then existing conditions. What I said with reference to the previous level about people who will the existence of the State necessarily also willing to obey all its laws so long as they remain on the statute-book, holds also at this level.

Our conclusion, then, is that, at whichever level we take the genuine will, not only do the people genuinely will the existence of the State, but also, though they do not genuinely will that it should have precisely, or perhaps even remotely, its present form and enforce its present laws, they do genuinely will to obey all its laws except those (if any) which are such that, in respect to them, obedience is more detrimental to the existence of the State than disobedience.

THE BASIS OF POLITICAL OBEDIENCE.

By F. L. McCAY,
Melbourne.

THE following might well be entitled "Animadversions of a Youthful Disciple of Idealism consequent upon Reading the Article of Mr. W. M. Ball in the September Issue of This Journal." With that article it is impossible not to have sympathy amounting almost to a general agreement; and I doubt whether what follows could be regarded as opposed to Mr. Ball's main thesis.

The question why men do certain things in certain circumstances is a question of fact. It is a question which may be dealt with from a psychological point of view, without considering ethics. But when we approach that question from the point of view of social philosophy it does not seem easy to maintain this clear separation. For by social philosophy I mean, and I submit that most social philosophers substantially mean, the study of an ideal society and of the relations (of non-realization or partial realization, possible attainment *et cetera*) of existing society to that ideal. At least this study must always be an important part of the whole and a part which with its spirit informs the whole. When, therefore, we seek to estimate the meaning and importance for social philosophy of human motives it is impossible to exclude ethical considerations, for it is these considerations which impart that meaning and that importance.

Thus, if we wish to understand the social significance of the motives of political obedience we must state our problem in terms that are ethically sound. I do not mean that it would be wrong to inquire, first, how important in fact is the element X in human motives, and then, what ethical value X has. But unless some positive result be derived from the second of these inquiries the first is worth little. To know how far the spirit of gambling sustains society becomes of first importance to the social philosopher only when he knows that the gambling spirit has ethical significance and what that significance is. So also to ask whether obedience rests upon free consent may come perilously close to begging the question of the ethical importance of free consent.

It may be suggested that the question would be begged rightly. If we oppose "consent" or "will," to "force" it cer-

tainly seems clear that to control men by "consent" is better than to control them by "force". If a man be controlled by anything other than his own reason, then by so much is he rendered less rational and by so much is value lost. But this is not to say that other and greater values may not have been gained. And of course freedom in the absolute sense of complete accord with all existing institutions, or even with the exact nature of the central principles of existing institutions, cannot exist in human society. It is, therefore, not right to regard the question of "force" v. "consent" as important if by "consent" is meant this complete freedom, or any mere watering-down of the same.

Despite critics who allege that philosophy has decided nothing in two thousand odd years, we can, I think, claim to know something more of the nature of the Good than did men before Plato. And virtue may fairly be defined as the realization of that Good. It is aspiration towards the Good that constitutes life; and success in this aspiration is the realization of ethical value. If this be so, the basis of society is aspiration. Mr. Ball says (and shows) that "in the strict meaning, all action that is not involuntary in the physical sense is the outcome of will or consent". By "force" he means the restriction of aspiration—the hindering of the free expression of life within narrow bounds. Force, then, is not the basis of society; at most it is an ordering element which makes effective the crude energy which is that basis. And as by political obedience is meant a positive element in society so of it also force which is restriction cannot be the basis. This is not to say that force (in any of its varying degrees) is not necessary for the existence of society (and political obedience), nor of course is it to say that force may not exist in undesirable forms. To say that aspiration is the right basis of society and to say that aspiration is its actual basis is not to say that its actual basis is right. The middle term is not identical; the existing aspiration should be fuller and more effectual. Nor of course does the theory imply that all actual aspiration is realized. To be the basis of a thing is not the same as to be completely realized in it. The theory does imply that an increase in total of realization (such total being computed with due regard to the qualitative difference in desires which arises from their synthesis in life) is necessarily good (unless it is such as to cause a future more important decrease); but not that an increase in the realization of any particular desire is necessarily good. For this might interfere with the realization of others. A word must be said in justification of the use of the term "aspiration" instead of "will".

I do not suggest that the latter term has not often been used with as full a meaning as the former; but I think that "aspiration" more naturally admits of the differences of meaning just indicated. It is clear immediately that a man's aspirations may be more or less coherent and more or less effectual and more or less worthy. Human action and thought, moreover, is not the static thing that the term "will" suggests.

The problem should, therefore, I submit, be put thus: How far is human aspiration towards the good realized in society? Human aspiration might theoretically be to a large extent realized in a society the principal laws whereof were prescribed by an external legislator, a philosopher-king. But as I have already stated, social control of institutions is a value for this reason if for no other; that because the basis of obedience is aspiration, therefore, men should understand the laws that control them; and because thought and action are and should be closely connected in men, therefore it is better that men use their knowledge in a practical way, that is, control those things humanly controllable which they understand. If the problem be rightly regarded in this light, it is evident that the will-philosophers are expressing a truth, although in a form likely to lead to error. Thus, when Locke says, "the reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their property; and the end while they choose and authorise a legislature is that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the society . . . (so) . . . whenever the legislators endeavor to take away and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience . . .", while no doubt he is entirely wrong in so far as his statement concerns property, yet he is right in so far as he lays down the ethical principle that the authority of government lies altogether in its works, and in so far as he states it to be a fact that unless the people prefer existing society to whatever alternative offers, that society cannot stand. This must be subject to the admissions (for what they are worth) that over a short space of time a strong military section of the people may coerce the remainder, and that of course a small minority may be violently opposed to the existing system. It is also true that the only apparently possible alternative may be anarchy. Nor would it be fair to say that this is abstracting a very small element of truth from a statement that is essentially about property, and wrong. For Locke here, it is submitted, property meant the social means of production and distribution of wealth. He was perhaps mistaken in thinking

that the institution was well calculated to that end. But it was to that function of the institution of property that his mind was directed; and the institution does perform that function, though badly. Read the passage thus:—

“The reason why men enter into society is to ensure the efficient and equitable production and distribution of wealth . . . whenever the legislators endeavor to prevent such production and distribution . . . the people . . . are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience.” It is precisely because Capitalism does not work economic justice and the people know it that Capitalism is tottering to-day. The Communist party have acted upon Locke’s principle. The chief reason why the great number of unsatisfied citizens have not, is that they prefer the existing circumstances to the probable social consequences of such disobedience, not that they personally fear immediate unpleasant consequences.

It is not unimportant that this fact, as I state it that society ethically and in fact is based on aspiration, should be appreciated. If it is a fact then it is true, and even had it no obvious practical significance, and had not experience taught us that truth now of no such significance may later acquire it, yet the truth is important to all philosophers. But it has this significance: it must be the basis of all schemes of reform in its ethical aspect of their creation and in its factual aspect of their realization. But neither is the nature of the restrictions upon aspiration, in various ways and in different fields, unimportant. These are the things to which a “realist” philosopher attends. The fault of idealism is, I suggest, rather that many of its exponents shut their eyes to the importance of certain facts than that the philosophy itself is inconsistent with them. It needs nothing to show that the existing social system does fail by a great deal to satisfy those human aspirations that with our knowledge and resources we may reasonably hope to satisfy. It is also true that the majority of citizens in a modern democracy know this; and that they have according to political theory under their control the instrument, namely, the supreme legislators of the State, capable of altering the system. But they do not do so on account, as Mr. Ball shows, chiefly of ignorance and economic weakness. Both of these obstacles arise largely from the peculiar defects of the existing system, and that system frequently sanctions its own continuance with the threat of extreme discomfort, if not of starvation, with of course the sanction of property-protecting laws behind that sanction.

One point which arises is that of the relation of the *de facto* realization of aspirations in society to the control

exercised by those aspirations over the institutions that enable their realization. I remarked above that it is abstractly possible that institutions should accord with aspirations without the latter having affected the former, without denying the rectitude of an aspiration to have institutions affected by aspirations. (Here, of course, and throughout, the concept of aspiration is a psychological and not merely a logical one. Thus A's aspiration is not B's aspiration, though both be the "same" aspiration.) Such accord without control perhaps never occurs in a complete form. But, for example, the accord between the system of private law of a country and the *volksgeist* may be largely due to the natural similarity of those persons who co-operate in the legislation (e.g., the lawyers) and their contemporaries. Much existing aspiration may only partly contribute to such accord therewith as exists in institutions. It seems that the fuller and more direct this contribution, *ceteris paribus*, the sounder and more perfect would be the result.

We need to discuss how far any and what aspiration realizes itself in existing society, and how far what institutions are adapted to that realization, and in particular how far this aspiration is realized, that aspiration should not only be realized in, but also effect its realization in society. As pointed out above, it is not necessarily desirable for the sake of aspiration, in the case of any particular aspiration, that it should be realized. Despite the ethical relevancy claimed for the concept of aspiration, therefore, the answers arrived at in such discussion will have no immediate ethical significance. But if deep-seated aspirations be considered—if aspiration be taken concretely in the idealist sense—then of course it will be otherwise.

Mr. Ball discusses the question of how far the "will" of the community supports the "primary laws". It is difficult to see exactly what is meant by "primary laws" here. They are described as being (for example) "those which prohibit the violation of a man's person or property". But it is a whole system of law which prohibits such a violation. Take, for example, the rule laid down in the Six Carpenters' Case in 1610, "that when an entry or licence is given to any one by the law, and he doth abuse it, he shall be a trespasser *ab initis*; but when an entry, authority, or licence is given by the party, and he abuses it, there he must be punished for his abuse, but shall not be a trespasser *ab initis*". Is this a "primary law" or part of a "primary law"? If the latter, what are the "secondary" laws? If by "primary law" is meant the fundamental principles of analytical jurisprudence—Kohler's

"juristic postulates of the time and place"—then it must be pointed out that, though the lawyer and the jurist must frequently seek to understand the nature of principles which as central principles of the law have become largely fictional while they still remain important in their effect upon detail, yet the philosopher looks at the substance of the matter, and he must not regard these juristic postulates as distinct existentially from the "stream of government enactments". They are universals and these enactments are their particulars.

These postulates are in the nature of implements for the procuring of certain social conditions in which aspirations will be realized. They do not pretend to satisfy aspirations themselves. So popular dissatisfaction is directed rather at their results in the particular circumstances in which they operate than at the postulates themselves. To this dissatisfaction they offer a resistance based in vested interests both material and intellectual and in legalistic ethics. They are like all institutions largely the product of a past none too recent; and even those which seem the most connected with the popular desires of bygone years (as the institution of marriage) have, I suggest, rather controlled popular aspiration than been controlled by it. There is often a great deal, and there is today a very great deal, in actual society which does not accord with the reigning postulates. But socialist aspirations receive no great satisfaction in socialist modifications of individualist institutions which seem to strengthen individualism by making those institutions workable. In short, these postulates or institutions are entrenched behind their own bulk and complexity and safely so entrenched because of the lack of intelligent power to dislodge them. Often those who love them least serve them best. But the solid ground on which they rest, the backbone of the hundred and one motives, good and bad, which support them, is the fact that they do to a degree perform the tasks that are to be performed in their various spheres.

One phase of society which is peculiarly interesting today in this connection is the mass of economic organizations. The economic system is such as to provide no clear and direct relation between the aspirations (or needs) of men, either as producers or as consumers, and any economic unit. The satisfaction afforded these needs (and, of course, some degree of satisfaction is afforded them) arises not from a direct control of aspiration but from a distorted and indirect control supplemented by ideals of "service", paternalism, *et cetera*. And the non-organization and mis-organization has

the result of forcing into contradiction and conflict aspirations which at least have no logically necessary incompatibility. Thus a rational synthesis of the interests of the producers of goods (as such) with those of consumers of those goods cannot well be secured while the wage-earner and capital-owner are dependent upon the industry in question and at liberty to disturb it with irrelevant conflicts in which questions of industrial policy and standards of living are hopelessly jumbled. The nature of the organization which operates to satisfy the first material needs of the wage-earner effectively prevents the satisfaction of his aspirations (for example) as a craftsman.

It is the theoretically omnipotent legislature which is the centre of all questions of the general control of popular aspirations over society in modern democracies. A true control by aspiration which would thereby realize itself, can only take place in so far as the aspiration of X is consistent with the aspiration of Y and of X himself, and has its nature developed and explicit. The more educated a people in which some form of majority is in use, the more truly is that people a democracy. For while it is true that education promotes difference of opinion, it also promotes consistency of opinion—the development of opinion renders possible this double development. Moreover, the less dangerous social experiments are liable to be (and, as Mr. Ball indicates, today they may be very dangerous), the more knowledge is in reach of the experimenters; and so the greater power have they. Education, thought, discussion, decision, these are the true tools of democracy. Through these some sort of dialectical process may work itself out in society and a compromise be effected between the aspiration to control and the mass of other human aspirations. Of these vital functions, majorities and ballot-boxes are only the outward forms.

It is no derogation from the principle that aspiration should be empowered to enable its own realization beyond what is inevitable in the affairs of finite men, that the details of power should be delegated together with details of aspiration (that is to persons who specialize in the study of the realization of particular social goods), nor that compromises should be made between the powers accorded to larger and to smaller areas (spatial or otherwise) of the community. But the necessity for such delegations and compromises may be met in more or less efficient ways; and the representative democratic system of today is doubtless clumsy. The system which may grant to a man chosen for his ecclesiastical opinions

(say) a voice in foreign policy can hardly be the last word. The "mechanical obstacle" can never be eliminated, but may be progressively overcome. The struggle against such an obstacle as this is largely the struggle of aspiration against sheer nothingness—it is the effort to create. The powers of darkness are the most effective foes; it is strictly comparable to the search for the cause and cure of cancer. But in all cases there are the complications arising from conflicting and entrenched aspirations. The existence of these is not to be wondered at. It is difficult enough for any man to make a rough and ready synthesis of his own chief aspirations supposing him to be working *in vacuo*. But when the situation is complicated by the facts that—

- (a) he does not know what institutions will produce what results;
- (b) existing institutions form a complex environment to which his efforts must be conformed to produce a result (*e.g.*, the existence and nature of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia may well lead a man to adopt theories of central and local government not for their own sake but because he wishes a public authority to discharge functions which neither Federal nor State parliaments are at present alone able to perform);
- (c) the conventional ethics which existing institutions produce for their own support confuse his judgment—

it is not strange that he rarely goes direct to his real end. Every genuine aspiration has many logically irrelevant ramifications.

An account of the realization of aspirations in society is of course nothing less than an account of all social institutions viewed from a vast number of varying ethical standpoints. An account of the control exercised by aspiration while only a part of that would be (and is) for volume a science in itself. The preceding paragraphs have attempted to show the sort of results that I imagine would derive from such a study. They are results of very great complexity—an "amazing conflict of wills". This does not imply the invalidity of generalizations; but it is a reason for great caution. For example, the statement that economic forces are a heavy restriction on popular economic aspirations is very true. But these "economic forces"—by which is meant, I take it, the resistance offered to reform in any of a number of ways by the existing system of production and distribution

—are the outcome of many various aspirations working together in a considerably disordered fashion in time. Ignorance, selfishness, love, patriotism, chance, and the constitution of matter are among the causes. To simplify the affair into a struggle of the many against the few seems false. Even if in any instance it does for a moment become that, it is always so much more than that. Though economic conditions were at first only “the outcome of policies framed by a small body of men for whom economic profit is the primary motive”, yet the strength of these policies when framed derives from other sources. And a man does not “rule” or “frame” what he merely supports; he controls only what he creates, or declines to destroy in favour of something else, to the limited extent of his power of intelligent choice.

But whatever may be the true nature of the limits on human aspiration, these things are clear: that many aspirations which might well be realized (including the aspiration to control) are not realized; that in many cases (*e.g.*, in patriotism) this is just as well; but that in many cases it is far from well. Through education and organization aspiration may yet become self-consistent and effectual.

DISCUSSION.

A CONTRARY VIEW OF HEDONISM.

It is refreshing to find an exponent of psychology courageous enough to come forward as a champion of a school of thought that is widely regarded as belonging to an age of the past, and Mr. Piddington, in setting forth his view of psychological hedonism, makes a useful contribution to the elucidation of a doctrine of mind that has held an extensive sway and that should not be treated as unworthy of very careful consideration. His essay cannot fail to prove thought-provoking, even though many perhaps of his readers will incline to see the issues as rather different from what he conceives them to be.

Mr. Piddington very wisely emphasizes the importance in discussion of a careful definition of terms, but one of the most serious objections that must be raised to his essay is his declining to define the most important terms employed in the argument, namely, "pleasure" and "happiness". He is, however, to be commended without any reservation for so setting forth his position as to leave not the slightest misconception as to where he stands.

May I suggest, however, that the most general tendency today is to consider hedonism as a theory that gives special prominence and sanction to the predominance of emotional factors or forces in experience. To put the matter a little more explicitly, in the language of the tripartite formula of mind, the hedonist views intellection and volition as aspects of mental life essentially subsidiary to, and perhaps even subservient to, emotion. It was for many ages the custom to think of the mind as made up of more or less water-tight compartments, or at any rate to suppose that certain aspects of the mental states can be separated in reality from the totality of such states. It seems to me that the strongest objection to hedonism (as I conceive it) lies in the fact that its acceptance necessitates the view that we can isolate various phases of a mental process and categorically affirm that some one of these is of supreme importance. Certain of Mr. Piddington's phrases lead one to conclude that he subscribes to some such doctrine, while the title of his essay contains more than a suggestion of a similar way of regarding the sciences as isolated and independent units, in that he is prepared to uphold "psychological hedonism", but shies clear of "ethical hedonism". I cannot help remarking in this attitude an apparent resemblance to members of the old school of Herbartian Educationists who illogically pledged themselves to their master's psychological dicta and pedagogical practice, while staunchly repudiating their metaphysical foundations and ethical counterparts. While there is an obvious necessity that in the treatment of psychology we should study "life as emotion", "life as intellection", "life as volition", there is an evident danger of our coming to view specific mental processes as "pure emotion", "pure intellection", *et cetera*, or, with even greater speciousness, as "dominated" by one or other of these "entities" of the mind. Now I think that the day is long past when life could be conceived of as such an interplay of faculties.

To me it seems that the fundamental position of all forms of hedonism is reached by leaping from the indisputable premise that

"emotion plays an important part in all mental processes", to one or other—openly expressed or implicitly assumed—of the following conclusions, as pragmatically unsound as they are fallaciously reached:

- (i) "emotion is the *most important factor* in mental life",
- (ii) "emotion is the '*modus operandi*' of mental life",
- (iii) "emotion is the '*terminus ad quem*' of mental life",
- (iv) "emotion is the *sovereign ruler* over intellect and will".

There cannot, I think, be any reasonable manner of doubt that life is a more or less continuous affair of setting up aims or ideals and proceeding towards their accomplishment. That there is an element of emotion in all parts of the process—and peculiarly, though never entirely separated from other elements, in what we may call satisfaction or gratification—I hold to be incontrovertible. The point at which I must part company with the hedonist and reverse his proposition is when he asserts that the aim and object of activity is the pleasure-tone of gratification and not the whole process of achievement.

JAMES MACKENZIE.

6 Isabella Road, London, E.9.,
14th August, 1932.

REVIEWS.

HAMLET: A STUDY IN CRITICAL METHOD. By A. J. A. Waldock, M.A., Lecturer in English Literature in the University of Sydney. London: Cambridge University Press; 1931. Pp. x + 102.

The ultra-modern attitude towards Shakespeare finds Australian expression for the first time in this little book. Apart from the fact that it is thus a milestone, the book is interesting, even if one does not agree with all its contentions. For one thing, Mr. Waldock's style is attractive, partly perhaps because, although it reflects something of his fondness for Henry James, it is so personal. To one who knows him, Mr. Waldock is there speaking; one can hear the varying tones of his voice. As to the content: the attitude I have mentioned represents a revulsion from nineteenth century hero-worship, to which Shakespeare's creations were life itself and his art beyond question, so that anything faulty in the plays must be extraneous. Of course the leading critics did not go so far as this, but it is always the exaggerations of the over-enthusiastic rank and file that excite a revulsion. And it is natural that argument should centre upon *Hamlet*, as being at once the most popular of the plays and that in which Shakespeare is believed to have given us the closest glimpse of his mind and personality. So, whereas in the past attempts have been made to iron out every apparent inconsistency in this as in the other plays, nowadays J. M. Robertson (for instance) points out that Shakespeare was not "deeply concerned to secure perfect artistic consistency", and several critics contend that the psychology of his characters is often wrong, simply because he was not able to construct a perfect unity out of conflicting materials. And E. E. Stoll, Professor of English in the University of Minnesota, who is one of the leaders of revolt, forbids us to think of any dramatic characters as real persons; "out of the pattern or the plot", he declares, "they have no existence nor ever had any". So it is foolish to speculate upon Hamlet's thoughts or actions before the first scene or between the scenes or acts. It would seem to follow that the same veto should govern our speculations about a

neighbour whom we see only in his back yard or front garden, and of whom we may know much less than we do of Hamlet; we are surely not entitled to assume in him any real existence off the only stage on which he appears before us. It is just possible, however, that Professor Stoll might not agree with us in this. By a curious irony there has sprung up alongside the school of thought represented by Professor Stoll, another, familiar no doubt to the readers of this journal, which accepts Shakespeare's characters as so real as to be fit subjects for psychoanalysis. Dr. Ernest Jones has actually psychoanalysed Hamlet in one of his *Essays in Applied Psychology*.

The particular problem investigated by Mr. Waldock is the old one of Hamlet's irresolution and delay. Summarizing the explanations that have been suggested hitherto, from that of Henry Mackenzie, the "Man of Feeling", onwards, Mr. Waldock sets aside the supposed external obstacles to the killing of the king as having no real existence, at least for us, since "the play does not urge them". And as to internal obstacles, he shows that Hamlet could have had no such scruples of conscience as have been sometimes suggested. His reason, for instance, for inaction in the prayer scene, is exactly the reason that he gives. This is good Elizabethan psychology; to kill a man at prayer was to send him straight to heaven. It is the same with Hamlet's doubt whether the spirit he has seen may not be the devil. This is not, as Bradley supposed, a mere excuse; such a doubt would have been quite natural in an Elizabethan. Mr. Waldock agrees with Ernest Jones in attaching importance to the play's "sexual quality", to the abnormal quality of Hamlet's feeling about the relationship between his mother and the king, and to the effect of this upon his attitude towards Ophelia; but he does not follow Dr. Jones into the subtle recesses of his analysis of Hamlet's Oedipus Complex. "We are left", Mr. Waldock says, "with the conclusion that Shakespeare did not trouble to make the Hamlet-Ophelia story plain, and in the face of his refusal are helpless". And he has already rejected Jones's contention—an extremely interesting one, even if we do not agree with the explanations he offers—that Hamlet's hands were tied by some inhibition which Shakespeare himself did not understand. What, then, was the trouble? Well, from one point of view it is our own super-subtlety, and from another it is the dramatist's inability to solve a difficult problem. Mr. Waldock points out that we must distinguish, in a drama, between a condition that may be discovered by armchair analysis, and a condition that is made evident upon the stage. "It is not sufficient that delay should be negatively implicit in the play; it is necessary for its dramatic existence that it should be positively demonstrated. The delay, in a word, exists just inasmuch and just to the degree in which it is conveyed". Mr. Waldock contends that on this basis delay is not perhaps even a major motive in the play. Most of what suggests delay to us is a result of "imperfect adaptations" by Shakespeare of incompatible materials. Some at least of the precautions that Hamlet took were the result of "a piece of the old design that was never quite adjusted to the new". The "O what a rogue" soliloquy represents "a slight bump in the highway of the plot. Shakespeare has left a little gap between two surfaces. Travelling at speed, we scarcely notice it; when, in our leisurely sweep, we slow down, we feel it". These are good points, but a large element in the Elizabethan audience was cultivated, practised, and extremely intelligent; and the fact that they were already familiar with the outline of the play would have allowed them opportunity for analysis. As for the ghost's reminder to Hamlet, to whet his "almost blunted purpose", Mr. Waldock admits that this remains a difficulty; it is "one of those meanings that will not square". There are others, of course, but they must be regarded in the light of

the play as a whole. And so regarded, their importance diminishes. "When we look back over the course of the play, it is not on one long delay that we think. The changing spectacle, the absorbing story, have left us space only now and then for a glimpse of these doubts and hesitations. They are there, they are in the design; they are not the design. . . . The question, 'Why did Hamlet delay?' instead of being the question about Hamlet, is a question that in our immediate experience of the play (which is our all-important experience) does not, after all, very seriously arise." It will be noted that Mr. Waldock, instead of pretending to have an answer to everything, has the courage to admit that some of the perplexities of this most difficult as well as most fascinating of plays do not fit his theory very precisely. And at the end of an interesting analysis, the play, "a work of art with a design that is deceptive and intricate and somewhat misleading", is left in "the eternal piquancy of its imperfection".

Mr. Waldock would be the first to admit that the critics are not likely, and perhaps ought not to leave *Hamlet* and its creator thus. That the most troublesome and attractive of its apparent inconsistencies may yet be solved is conceivable to some of those who, while admitting that Shakespeare is not beyond question, and that for one reason or another he did not always join all his flats, are yet convinced that at least his principal characters are self-consistent.

H. M. GREEN.

AN ADVANCED TEST OF GENERAL INTELLIGENCE. By Nora M. Hales. Issued by Australian Council for Educational Research. Melbourne University Press, 1932. Pp. 60. Price: Three shillings and sixpence.

The progress of psychological testing depends on the instruments at the disposal of investigators, and in the past the absence of a satisfactory test of general intelligence has been a handicap. The standard "Army Alpha" test was only a beginning, and Australian students have frequently drawn attention to many of its weaknesses. The revision of this test has been undertaken by Miss Hales, M.A., and the publication of her work is an important contribution to the psychologist's equipment. The work includes two additional tests—sentence completion and written directions, while all the items in the American test which had only a local reference have been eliminated and others more suitable substituted. The authoress makes no claim that her test is final and complete, but it is to be regarded as "a temporary working instrument" which will serve to measure certain capacities of the factors which are concerned in general intelligence.

A. H. Martin, M.A., Ph.D., in an explanatory preface, sets out clearly what the term "general intelligence" means to different leading psychologists, and this summary should be of great value to students. It is essential to be definite on what the test purports to measure, and readers, even though they may differ in their views of the problem, must agree that the test has been designed to measure "those factors of general capacity to cognise relationships and the more specific aptitudes involved in number, language and memory".

Tentative standards for the test, which is known as "Test H", have been obtained from an examination of 2,654 subjects, mainly boys and girls in different grades at various types of school in New South Wales. The statistical data are comprehensive and illuminating and a close survey of the figures must be a source of interest and information to any educationalist who realizes the problems in the school world.

In recent years the general public have come to look more favourably on vocational guidance, but it seems that in the near

future the use of mental tests as a basis for prognosis of academic achievement will be accepted as an equally important study.

There are educationalists of repute who assert that the present system of starting children on specialized studies at the age of twelve years is quite wrong, and considering the state of flux of the child mind at and about this age one must respect their opinions. If specialization commenced at the age of fourteen, and if students were selected by means of reliable tests, then much waste effort and energy would be conserved. While the method of grading pupils for various types of studies on educational tests alone may give a fairly reliable guide, it does not eliminate those "border line" cases which present so much difficulty. A properly standardized test accurately correlated with school progress would be a more rigid method of exclusion. Even in one type of school if tests of a suitable nature could be found which would furnish a reliable guide on which to forecast achievement in special school subjects, it would be of tremendous importance. Primary education aims at giving a general education and an examination of content at the end of this period is not a reliable guide to various specialized secondary school courses. Miss Hales states that "Test H" could be adapted to remedy the defect and she suggests the possibility of investigation along these lines.

One other suggestion for the application of this test with which one cannot agree, is that it could be used to give a measure of the general intelligence of the community. Even if this could be done accurately, it would only be an item of interest, and could not be used as a basis for comparison with individual cases.

Dealing with the ten individual tests which make up the test material, it should be noted that Test 1 is not usually given first to subjects for obvious reasons, and Test 4 takes its place. Test 2, "Written Directions", contains items which are very difficult and which seem to be problems for solution rather than directions to be followed. The present Tests No. 3 and No. 7 can be used to indicate that a subject who scores poorly in them has no arithmetical ability, but the converse is not necessarily true. Test 9 contains some questions, answers to which are the direct result of school training, and these could possibly be replaced by questions involving the facts of our environment, which we are not specifically taught. These remarks, however, apply only to minor details and, viewing the publication on broad principles, one must commend Miss Hales on the clear, concise presentation of the test material, directions, scoring method and results.

H. F. BENNING.

HEGEL (NEL CENTENARIO DELLA SUA MORTE). *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica*. Supplemento speciale al Volume XXIII, Dicembre, 1931. Milan, 1932.

The *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* has published a number consecrated to Hegel for the centenary of this author's death, an idea all the more interesting because it takes on a quite international character as the volume took the form of general reviews on the beginnings of Hegelianism in the different European countries, its development, its influence, its condition at the present time. The Rector of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart [L'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore] brings out clearly in his preface the intention of his review:¹ "To demonstrate exactly the influence of Hegelian theories and their positive and negative effects on contemporary culture and

¹ *Hegel*: Le ragioni di questo volume XIV and XV.

civilization, I thought it was opportune to collect these essays by students of scholasticism, essays which, as it seems to me, might constitute a panorama of Hegelianism in our day. They allow us to embrace in a comprehensive frame the developments of Hegel's doctrines in America and England, both by natural inclination little open to high metaphysics, in Russia and in Germany where the fortune of Hegel was neither deep nor lasting, in France and Italy, in which Hegelianism had its extreme logical developments."

One cannot sufficiently praise such a volume. It is a comforting thing to see that for once we are not taking a flight over Europe and America just to enumerate their best or their worst point, but simply, and ardently, to follow out in each nation the destinies of a philosopher's ideas. What strikes one above all in a work like this is to see to what point Hegel's thought has offered varied forms of nourishment to philosophers and to what point, when analysing the same ideas, they issue in different results. One sees and understands only through oneself, even and perhaps above all when one has a strong philosophic temperament, and the reality which issues from the contemplation or the reflection of an individual ["it does not issue from anything", some will say, "it is"—but thereby even they affirm not reality but their temperament, and prove abundantly that the question remains entirely open], this reality cannot in any degree be absolutely independent of the thinking subject. Better still, the volume published by the *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* obliges us once more to recognize the perhaps somewhat sorry fact that it is not to be denied that all the philosophers of a given nation join to their subjective character a certain common national character. We see, for example, that Hegelianism was met in America "with a hard wall of common sense and practical self-observation".¹ A common sense which has not the slightest logical character and which prepares for Hegelianism a destiny quite different from that which it will find in France. Whereas, in England for instance, Hegelianism will be hardly anything than a series of laborious attempts to reconcile philosophy and Christianity (with the exception of McTaggart). It is useless to dwell much on the matter. Only a profound and learned analysis could bring out the utility and the high interest of a volume which does great honour to the initiative of the *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica*.

C. H. BARBIER.

AN INTRODUCTION TO LIVING PHILOSOPHY: A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY TYPES AND PROBLEMS. By D. S. Robinson, Ph.D. 371 pp. + Index. Thomas Y. Crowell and Coy., New York.

The problem of introducing students to the study of Philosophy is a difficult one and opinions still differ widely as to the best method of doing it. Probably the best method depends very largely on the teacher. Dr. Robinson's plan of plunging the student into contemporary philosophical problems has something to recommend it, but in the actual operation of the plan this advantage is soon lost. Modern philosophical doctrines take their shape partly from the theories of the past and partly from the environment in which the thought of the philosopher has been developed. Thus some sort of historical background is necessary and in this case the author is therefore driven to include a chapter which is largely a classification of schemes of philosophy and of the various branches of them, with some very short

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 161, quot. of Noah Porter's *The Human Intellect*, p. 59.

explanatory notes (Part I, Chapter V) and to end with a section "The Convergence of Types" that takes us in a couple of pages from Galileo and Descartes to Dewey and Bergson. Naturally in the text the author has not been able to forget the past. We doubt if this method will give the beginner any real conception of the development of human thought.

It may be said, and with some show of fairness, that we ought to consider this text-book as part of a wider teaching plan, for the author has published "An Anthology of Modern Philosophy" and "An Anthology of Recent Philosophy", to which very frequent references are made in the book under review, in some cases in rather an amusing form, *e.g.*, "Quoted from my Anthology of Modern Philosophy, p. 549. The original source is Fichte's Vocation of Man, Pt. III."

The book really falls into four parts, the first being devoted to Orientation; the second, to Idealism; the third, to Realism; and the fourth, to Pragmatism. The photographs of Royce, Santayana, James, Dewey and Bergson are given in the book and on the wrapper, but the text does not restrict the treatment to these men. On the whole the presentation is clear but occasionally very naïve statements appear, *e.g.*, "All existing universities and college fraternities fall a *little* short of being ideal" (p. 69, italics mine), and sometimes very dogmatic ones, *e.g.*, "And if this is what art is, then art is not possible unless the beautiful is real. And the beautiful cannot be real unless the spiritual world is real. And the spiritual world cannot be real unless it is sustained by, and infused with, 'that living Will which shall endure, when all that seems shall suffer shock'. Hence beauty is real because it is part of the essence of God" (p. 130). The author is obviously an enthusiastic idealist and frequently breaks his own maxim that philosophy should not be propagandist, *e.g.*, "Unless there is some spiritual order, some kingdom of ends, some city of God, some Church triumphant, where the spirits of just men are made perfect in love, how can goodness have any real existence?" (p. 131). The author is clearly at his best when he is not in the pulpit but is stating and criticizing the views with which he does not agree.

A fifth part is added under the title "Other Types", but this is little more than a collection of references to other workers whose views cannot be classed under the main heads already given, though in the last chapter an attempt is made to develop the notion of "The True Philosophy". Apparently the author is prepared to distinguish his personal philosophy from his philosophy as an American citizen with the culture of his people, and both from his philosophy taken from the viewpoint of humanity, and all of these from his philosophy as a spectator of all time and all existence. I fear that this juggling with positions is more likely to bedevil the student than to enlighten him; and the subsequent attempt to make clear to students what "the true philosophy" is ends by telling them, "That system of philosophy towards which all our contemporary types are converging will not be identical with any of them because it will contain only what is durable and eternal in the thought of our age. But that new system which is now in the making is the answer to our question. It is the true philosophy." It would need a Macaulay to deal with this kind of writing. I cannot believe that this text book will replace any of the much better books that already exist.

The book is very well produced, but there are some misprints; one does not expect to find "spinal chord" (p. 114) in a book of this type.

T. A. HUNTER.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS OF SOME REPRESENTATIVE THINKERS OF THE AGE OF REACTION AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1815-65. Ed. F. J. C. Hearnshaw, M.A., LL.D. Harrap, London. Price: 8s. 6d. net.

This volume deals with the period 1815-65, and gives an account of eight political thinkers chosen from this vast field. Many of these accounts are well and vigorously written. Theodora Bosanquet gives a clear picture of Comte's fantastic Utopia, with its strange mixture of modern progressiveness and mediæval discipline. Keith Feiling writes with customary vigour of Coleridge and those associated with him; his essay, though full of information and of good thinking, is somewhat disjointed, for the field covered is very wide. Mr. A. D. Lindsay begins his essay on Hegel by remarking that much of what Hegel writes is difficult to comprehend; a remark which most of us will accept. But Mr. Lindsay's own account is, in a less degree, difficult reading also. However, he brings out well Hegel's emphasis on history as *becoming*, and on the need for uniting individual liberty with care for the good of all. Frances Page gives a good discussion of Robert Owen, though her discussion opens with some unhelpful generalizations, and towards the end lapses from its highest standard. Mr. R. S. Dower has collected much information about J. S. Mill, but it is presented in rather disjointed form. Constantia Maxwell describes well the confusion surrounding Chateaubriand's thought and actions. How, indeed, can one make coherent the thought of a man who believes in Bossuet and Voltaire at the same time? Finally, the editor himself writes of John Austin. He gives much good matter, though the essay is marred by irritating defects; especially by a fondness for out-of-the-way phrases and words which often miss their mark. How, for example, does one dam a metaphor, and what is a punctuated peace? And some people will deny that "all theological controversies are logomachies" (even after looking the word up in a dictionary).

In general, one wishes that the editor had cast his net rather more widely. The introductory chapter by Professor Sykes adds little to our knowledge of a much studied period, and its exclusion might have made room for some thinkers of great practical importance. After all, Liberalism and Reaction fought many a pitched battle during the period covered by this volume. Canning's "New World" came into being; by painful steps the foundations were laid for national states in Italy and Germany; by slow degrees Europe built up the system and civilization we know, and gained strength which was shortly to reach outwards in restless Imperialism. But this present volume as it stands gives little help towards the understanding of these things. One can only hope that the following volume of the same series will repair the most obvious gap by telling something of Mazzini.

F. L. Wood.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LITERARY APPRECIATION, by D. C. Griffiths. (Issued by the Australian Council for Educational Research.) The Melbourne University Press.

It is difficult to write a book on such a subject as this which will satisfy literary critics and psychologists alike. Students of literature are gradually perceiving the defects in their equipment which proceed from a lack of proper psychological knowledge, but many of the attempts to apply psychology to literature have broken down. For example, the intelligent and well-informed volume of L. P. de Vries on *The Nature of Poetic Literature* (University of Washington Publications, 1931) contains an excellent statement of psychological principles, but the effect of the volume is rendered almost nugatory

by the fact that these principles are applied not to problems of the creation and appreciation of literature but to the criticism of characters in literature.

It is to be feared, however, that Mr. Griffiths will satisfy neither the psychologists nor the literary critics. His psychology, if one who is no psychologist may criticize it, is not so much a psychology as a series of scraps from several psychologies, and the looseness with which he uses his terms betrays the lack of an adequate philosophical training. A single example of the last-mentioned tendency must suffice. I. A. Richards in his *Principles of Literary Criticism* (pp. 239-243) distinguishes six different ways in which the word "imagination"—a word of vital importance in literary criticism—may be used. Mr. Griffiths, in saying (p. 21) that it will "be assumed to be closely connected with the word 'image'; it is the activity of the mind in image-making" is giving the word a wider sense than the first and "least interesting" of the six meanings distinguished by Richards. It is defined so loosely that any precision in its use is impossible, and, in fact, it is used in several of the senses mentioned by Richards, as well as in several others which have apparently escaped his notice.

However, where literary students will quarrel most with Mr. Griffiths is in his inability to give any adequate explanation of the differences between good and bad literature. De Vries, who has already been referred to, is careful to distinguish between the dream state, day dreaming, and the creation and appreciation of literature; Mr. Griffiths, on the other hand, appears to regard the second two as mere extensions of the first. Yet he should have realized that, even without the theories of modern psychology, literary critics have been conscious of the importance of these fundamental distinctions. That Lamb was sensible of it we can see from his letter to Wordsworth on April 26, 1816, in which he is discussing the forthcoming publication of *Kubla Khan*, and J. L. Lowes, in his analysis of the same poem in *The Road To Xanadu*, has convincingly shown the difference between the mind's powers of organization in the dream and in the waking states.

This is an extreme instance, but the distinction between the day-dreaming induced by the modern best-seller or "talkie" and the mental enrichment and stimulation of a great piece of literature is fundamental not merely for literary criticism but for education as well. One of the greatest of the problems to be faced by modern education is the combating of the facile day-dreaming encouraged and catered for by the popular novelist and motion-picture producer, in order to maintain real artistic standards when they are being debased everywhere around us. Or, to state the problem in even lower terms, a sane and educated democracy must be able to recognize cant and humbug for what they are, even if some of the most serious and important writing of the age is above it. The importance of the work of Mr. Richards lies in the fact that he has not only insisted throughout his work on the conception of *value* in the quality of every kind of artistic experience, but that he has provided a psychological approach to the problem just suggested by propounding a theory of value in psychological terms.

Mr. Griffiths has paid but scant attention to the topics mentioned in the last paragraph; indeed, he seems to be unaware of the existence of Richards's *Principles of Literary Criticism*, *Science and Poetry*, and *Practical Criticism*, or of the very important work which has been produced under Mr. Richards's influence, such as W. Empson's *Seven Types of Ambiguity* and Mrs. Leavis's *Fiction and the Reading Public*. Although this is perhaps

her a reflection on the equipment of Australian libraries or the inadequate assistance possible for students who are attempting advanced work in Australia than on Mr. Griffiths, it reveals his work of any real value and reveals a weakness that would not be tolerated elsewhere. His position is, roughly, that of a student who attempted to write an account of the structure of the universe without mentioning Einstein. One might perhaps have accepted Mr. Griffiths's work for a master's thesis as a tribute to his reading and to his

honesty of purpose, but the book should never have been published in its present form. The Australian Council for Educational Research must see that its publications maintain a higher standard than this.

R. C. BALD.

THE CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS. By Eric Farmer, M.A. (Lond.). Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, 1932.

There are some few employers who, when the problem of accident causation is discussed, adopt the attitude of considering that the payment of accident insurance and the adoption of the suggestions of the factory inspector absolve them from further responsibility. To such this book will make no appeal. To those who look at the problem from the humanitarian and even the economic point of view, this brief treatise will prove of irresistible appeal.

The first chapter treats general factors which tend to cause accidents, such as fatigue, lighting, temperature, ventilation, age and experience of the individual. The second and succeeding chapters approach the problem from the point of individual proneness to accidents. In many cases where careful records are kept, it will be found that the same individual tends to incur repeated mishaps. As a result of psychological tests it was found possible to detect those who were thus more susceptible to accidents than the major portion of the group. By employing such individuals in positions in the works where the possibility of accidents is at a minimum, the general accident rate of an establishment may be appreciably lowered and this form of human wastage reduced.

A. H. MARTIN.

BERKELEY'S AMERICAN SOJOURN. By Benjamin Rand, Ph.D., LL.D. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.; 1932. Pp. ix+79. Price: 2 dollars.

Dr. Rand is the author of two very interesting monographs on Berkeley. On the basis of his disclosure in the former, "Berkeley and Percival" (1914), that Berkeley's period of travels on the Continent (1713-21) had been broken by an interval of two years (1715-16) of residence in England, it has been argued by Miss Marguerite Hersey, in her "New Light on the Evidence for Swift's Marriage", that the statement of Berkeley's widow that Berkeley had been informed of the marriage by the Bishop of Clogher can no longer be discredited, as it has been by Swift's biographers, on the ground that he was out of England at the time (said to be 1716). The present monograph is an account based on new discoveries from letters and diaries of Berkeley's sojourn in America (1729-32) while awaiting the receipt of a grant promised by the English Government, with which he proposed to establish a college at Bermuda. While in America Berkeley resided at Newport, Rhode Island, the scenery of which he described in his "Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher", which he wrote there. When it became clear that the Government would not make the promised grant, he gave the money which had been collected privately for his project to Yale, as well as his residence at Rhode Island. He made several other benefactions to both Yale and Harvard, and to American churches, and did much to promote the cause of learning in America generally. The university town of Berkeley in California was later so named "in remembrance of one of the very best of the early friends of college education in America". The grant which he had hoped to receive for Bermuda was afterwards given to the new college of Georgia. The illustrations and printing in this book are very pleasing.

G. F. McINTOSH.

AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF APPARENT MOVEMENT. By Sugu Mibai. No. 190 Psychological Review Monographs, Vol. XLII, No. 3. Psychological Review Coy., N.J.

The study of apparent movement is one that has engaged psychologists since 1912, and more particularly since the inception of "moving" pictures. The subjects used in the present investigation were untrained and the apparatus for exposure, an Eastman Kodascope and lengths of film. The stimuli were lines in various positions photographed on the film and exposed by means of the Kodascope. The work reported is an advance on previous laboratory work in that the positions of the lines used were at an angle to each other, and so involved apparent rotation of position. The conditions involved were carefully investigated. The "phi phenomenon" or "intermediate grey patch" between two positions was uncertainly observed by the untrained subjects. Speed conditions of exposure were directly under the control of the operator and are carefully reported on. One might suggest that the subsidized psychological investigation of such work might well form part of the programme of the wealthy film companies of the United States in the same way that radio investigation on the physical side has been subsidized.

A. H. MARTIN.

AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF PITCH RECOGNITION. By Laurence A. Petran. No. 193 Psychological Monographs, Vol. XLII, No. 6. Psychological Review Coy., N.J.; 1932.

As the writer points out in the history, the possession of individual capacity to name the absolute pitch of a note has been asserted and contradicted many times. The experimenter used a Stern's Tone Variator as apparatus and oxygen gas diffusing at a regular pressure to produce the sound. A number of teachers of music acted as subjects. The tests were carried on over a number of days with the subjects, instead of merely on one day only for each individual as is frequently the case. Variations in the regularity of individual's judgments were noted. The conclusion arrived at as a result of these experiments was: "that there is no gifted group of people who have a perfect absolute pitch, i.e., can tune the tone variator exactly and invariably to 440 d.v.s. from memory alone".

A. H. MARTIN.

THE NEURAL ENERGY CONSTANT. A STUDY OF THE BASES OF CONSCIOUSNESS. By John Bostock, M.B., B.S. (Lond.), D.P.M., M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P., Honorary Neurologist, Brisbane General Hospital. London: George Allen and Unwin; 1931. Price: 6/- net.

The tendency grows stronger to seek an adequate account of the neural foundations of consciousness. This tendency one can but welcome even though psychology must still be psychology and never merely neurology.

Pavlov, the great Russian physiologist, has carefully and meticulously worked upon "the conditional reflex". The result of that work is that we now know a good deal about the laws which govern the neural changes that condition learning, habit formation, and the neurotic symptom. The Behaviourist school has made this work its own to some advantage.

Then there is the work of the biologist, Professor Child, of Chicago University. His demonstration of "the differential susceptibility of the axial gradient" (see *The Origin and Development of the Nervous System*) gives just the necessary empirical justification for the theories of that genius Hughlings Jackson. From this work, too, it is almost obvious why "regression" is so natural, as also why thinking is so much more strenuous than imaging, and the control of instinct and emotion by reason so difficult. Child's "axial gradient" is also relevant to the work of Head and Holmes on

the "Overlordship of the Cortex", and on "Thalamic Overaction": the removal of cortical activity destroys discriminative thinking and action graduated to the intensity of the stimulus and leaves in their place emotional dominance and coarse reactions dominated by "the all or none principle".

All of this neurological and biological work is of first importance, and no psychologist or psychiatrist can possibly afford to neglect it. Submerged and dissociated neurograms, established originally on the Pavlovian principle, are almost certainly the basis of "the unconscious" which has been for so long what James would have called "a tumbling ground for whimsies".

And now Dr. Bostock enters this field with the interesting and challenging thesis that consciousness exhibits the three aspects of primitive awareness, emotion or coarse adjustment, and discrimination or fine adjustment. "Consciousness may be nearly all awareness, nearly all emotion, or nearly all discrimination." The basic conception of consciousness is the "universal urge to adjust". Awareness is first consciousness giving data for adjustment. It exists in unicellular organisms and in the separate cells of multicellular organisms, though in these the nerve cells provide more sensitive and quicker conductors of the stimulus. "It is significant that the nervous system is developed from epiblast, so vitally concerned in the awareness of external stimuli." Along with this primitive awareness goes the "urge to adjust" which is prior to the domination of behaviour by pleasure and pain or by the urge of sex.

This primitive simple consciousness, in the course of evolution, becomes located in the centres for reflex action and in those for sensation. The latter become located at the head end and tend to obscure the fact that primitive awareness still exists in the reflexes.

But the evolving organism has to adjust itself to the environment, to danger, and to its mate. This necessity leads to the appearance of a centre for emotion involving coarse adjustment. The emotional tones which permeate consciousness are based upon the primitive sensations of pain and extremes of heat and cold. In support of this view of the intimate relation of emotional consciousness to pain and temperature sensations, the author gives certain interesting illustrations. For example, the neurologist finds that the aches and pains of emotional patients are innumerable. The author thinks it strange that this basic truth of the intimate relation between pain and consciousness should have been so long neglected. Emotion, he thinks, is to be regarded as the first great step in co-ordinating the neurones and orientating the organism in its environment. It ensures that they shall all work together towards a definite goal. Commencing with the object of avoiding physical dangers and harmful temperatures, the mechanism was adapted to keep the individual searching for food by a feeling of hunger; for its mate by a feeling associated with the organ of sex, and so on. This directive force is, however, crude. It does not delineate the precise morsel of food to be eaten nor the exact mate to be found, but serves its purpose so long as they are easily found and plentiful. It is a coarse adjustment.

With specialization, however, comes the appreciation of subtle differences and distinctions. Improvement in the special senses leads to the detection of minute differences in weight, colour, touch, smell, taste and movement. These differences come to be regulated with precision and accuracy. Furthermore, these qualities must be preserved in memory and associated.

The development of specialisation would mean a vast development of new brain substance superimposed upon the centres of awareness and emotion. This new brain substance is the *neo-pallium* with its highest development in the *cortex-cerebri*. This organ the author calls "the centre for fine adjustment". Normally this higher consciousness becomes isolated from body consciousness. Children feel body sensations more than adults do, while psychasthenics and neurasthenics lead a miserable and useless existence because they are assailed by all sorts of sensations from every part of their anatomy. On the other hand, the best minds are capable of great detachment

from the sense world, with a corresponding capacity for undistracted mental work.

The centre for awareness is to be found in the *thalamus*, so also is the centre for emotion. The centre for fine adjustment is the *cortex-cerebri*. Here the author draws on the work of Head and Holmes. A suggestion of my own that on Dr. Bostock's own argument the centre for awareness should be situated approximately *below* the thalamus, leads the author to refer to the *hypothalamus* as the seat of awareness.

The other part of Dr. Bostock's thesis is that of "the neural energy constant". Here he asks why the mind can deal with only so small a fraction of its experience at a time; why of all the hundreds of millions of neurones only a few are active at a time. The answer is that the amount of neural energy (cf. McDougall's "neurokyme") is limited to a constant amount, so that the number of neurones active at any moment of consciousness is relatively small. The hypothesis of a constant flow of neural energy will account for the importance of the insulation of nervous tissue. If insulation were lacking, wastage of energy with consequent irregularity of flow would occur, just as any extraneous sensation slipping into consciousness would divert the stream of energy and render concentration of attention difficult.

In a chapter on psychological levels the author discusses the control of lower levels by higher. He rejects the view of direct inhibition. Inhibition results because the higher level is engaged upon problems of its own. Should the higher level be reduced by drugs, fatigue, sleep, senility, *et cetera*, the lower centres of emotion and awareness become released from inhibition. This view of inhibition is obviously the right one, and the author could have supported his view convincingly by referring to Child's work on the axial gradient.

By his theory the author is enabled to advance a new hypothesis to explain sleep. Sleep is produced by dissociation of the centres of awareness, emotion and fine adjustment. Evidence is that during sleep mental activity does occur; that during vivid consciousness sleep is difficult; that the best methods for inducing sleep are those which aim at dissociating the component parts of consciousness, namely, exclusion of stimuli and limitation of the centre for awareness; limitation of activity; reduction of emotional excitement; depression of the fine adjustment area by drugs. The author finds confirmation for his theory of sleep in the fact that in some cases of encephalitis, mainly involving the region of the *optic thalamus*, the patient remains somnolent for long periods. As this is precisely the centre for affect (emotion) and awareness it would seem that they have been dissociated, causing unconsciousness to ensue: to have complete consciousness all three centres must work together.

There follow interesting chapters in which the author's hypothesis of the three centres is applied to the explanation of Dreams, Instinct, and Mental Disease.

As opposed to Freud's theory of wish-fulfilment and the defeat of the censor, Dr. Bostock holds that "a dream is merely a state of partial consciousness in which the three centres of awareness, emotion and fine adjustment are in incomplete apposition, so that the dream may be due now to the first, now to the second, now to the third, and now to various incomplete or incongruous relations between them. The guiding principle of this dream-life is the same as that of full consciousness, namely, the urge to adjust. The bizarre nature of the dream imagery is the natural outcome of interruption in the normal linking up of the neurones" (pp. 102-103). The motive of the dream is the solution of some problem and not merely the fulfilment of a wish. The imaginary dinners of the Antarctic explorer may be as truly said to "solve a problem" as to "fulfil a wish". It seems to the reviewer that dreams range from associative drift to well-defined dreams calculated to solve real problems. Dreams seem to (1) review situations; (2) mingle things strangely during this review owing to lack of vigilant attention and

sometimes lack of purpose; (3) fulfil wishes vicariously and spuriously, or better imagine the satisfaction of some conation; and (4) solve problems, or better imagine a solution which may or may not point to a real way out.

The author rightly criticizes the unsatisfactory state of our knowledge about Instinct. He presents a modification of Muensterberg's definition in which instinct is "a form of pattern activity" which is dominated by "the universal urge to adjust". Child's account of pattern building fully supports this view of instinct. Yet Dr. Bostock, like most others who write about instinct, seems to confuse the issue by introducing unconsciously the peculiar complications which intelligence adds to so-called instinctive behaviour. The fact is, I think, that in man we usually do not observe pure instinctive action at all, but instinct modified by intelligence, memory and human purpose. For this reason, while in man when self-controlled, emotion is "a means of focussing energy upon a goal" and "the precise dispositions made towards this end are the product of the fine adjustment centre", yet, in lower animals, the precise dispositions are the result of structure (*e.g.*, a chicken pecks at grains fairly precisely on the first day, while two or three days later it pecks almost perfectly): and this structure is innate. Even in man, when the overlordship of the cortex (see Wood Jones and Porteus "The Matrix of the Mind") is removed, we approach pure instinctive action. The cortex, or centre for fine adjustment, does not come into operation until after the instinctive, passionate act, or excess, has been performed. Then it is too late for anything except remorse. No! the writers on instinct themselves create many of the difficulties they criticize. Dr. Bostock's difficulty about establishing which motive moves him to write his thesis, arises just from this cause. The fact that he may be preparing it from considerations of ambition, self-assertion, curiosity, parental care, *et cetera*, or from a mingling of these motives in mutual support is no argument against the driving power of instinct, but it is an argument which shows the complications which are possible in human motives as distinct from the behaviour of animals moved by pure instinct.

I do not agree with the author, either, that there is anything contradictory of instinct, as serving welfare, in the immobility and collapse which often accompany fear. A closer analysis not only shows that immobility and collapse have been the best safeguards of creatures who are preyed upon—it is quite often essential to remain still, movement is such a betrayal, except for creatures which are fleet of foot or quick on the wing; but it also shows that instinct, uncomplicated by intelligence, is a reality. I do not agree that, if the fine adjustment centre is not involved, immobility will result. What results in many animals, which have no fine adjustment centre, is rapid flight—a kind of behaviour that is determined by ancient instinctive structure. There is no more mystery in this than in all the other apparently mysterious results of evolution over a long time. The mere introduction of the centre of fine adjustment, which is highly developed only in man and the higher animals, prejudices the whole question of instinct as such and proves that what we call instinct in man is only occasionally pure instinct, and mostly instinct complicated by control from fine adjustment, or intelligence which introduces into the phylogeny of instinct proper ontogenetic factors, which are not instinctive but acquired through understanding and memory. Man is in a peculiar position, the position of being caught between action from structure and action from reason. This peculiar position it is which puts a great strain upon him in that he must neither live like an animal altogether, in the interest of instinct, nor deny his nature altogether, in the interest of reason and the truth. He must practise control, and the sensitive and weak in practising it often become neurotics under the strain. That is why animals do not suffer from neuroses to the extent that man does, and then it is only the higher animals which do so suffer occasionally.

In spite of minor disagreements, one finds this a stimulating and provocative book. One cordially agrees with the author that definitions are so

unsatisfactory and classifications of mental disorders so vague and overlapping that one can only conclude inadequate knowledge of basic facts to account for the vagueness. Dr. Bostock's consistent effort to explain by the interaction of the three basic centres for awareness, affect, and fine adjustment may be open to some criticism, but it is supported by a good deal of evidence from actual observation, and is a determined effort to get behind the confusions which exist at present among psychiatrists of different schools. The author speculates at times, but he speculates reasonably. On the whole, the approach is scientific, and has, in that respect, an advantage, for example, over Freudian mysticism and special pleading.

It is regrettable that the word "affect" should have been printed "effect" twice (p. 60 and p. 61).

H. TASMAN LOVELL.

MOSCOW IMPRESSIONS. By Allan G. B. Fisher, Professor of Economics, Otago University. Dunedin, 1932. Price: 1/-.

These impressions of a visit to Russia in January, 1931, are reprinted from articles which appeared in the *Otago Daily Times*. The writer expresses himself always guardedly and exhibits a rare capacity for objective judgment. At the close one feels that any deficiency is due to lack of time to study Russian conditions, and not to incapacity to do justice to what was observed. The writer thinks it "regrettable that in spite of the enormous literature which has been devoted to Russia there is still so little real understanding of what is going on there. Prejudice and fear still too often take the place of objective reporting." He says it is not true that visas for entry into Russia are refused unless the applicants place themselves entirely under the control of Government organizations while they are in Russia.

Transport seems to leave a good deal to be desired. Hotel service, too, was anything but satisfactory. There is an interesting account of Moscow trams, with the pressure from the end of entry towards the end of exit, in order to avoid being carried past one's stopping place.

In Moscow food was not plentiful, but the food shortage was less obvious than the writer expected. He was offered eggs at 1s. 3d. each, while milk and butter were almost unobtainable. Merely to quote Russian food prices into foreign currency is not fair to Russia, for while the expenditure of a rouble meant 2s. 1d. for an Englishman in Russia, it meant only a few pence for the Russian. Though Russia is by no means starving, the writer thinks Moscow no place for an epicure.

While a worker who wishes to join the Communist Party needs only two sponsors, the non-worker needs five. This suggests that perhaps the reaction against the rigid distinctions of Czarist Russia is in danger of leading to almost equally rigid distinctions with the old relations merely reversed.

There is in Russia great energy and practical zeal, though often ill-directed, which is in marked contrast to the slackness and reluctance to undergo the severe intellectual exertion of thinking out big plans which are often so noticeable with us. If the Five-Year Plan prove a success, then the author thinks that it would be foolish not to inquire into the causes of that success. One can cordially agree. No other country, except Italy, seems to have really taken hold of the present pressing problems.

The Five Day Week, by which each day one-fifth of the staff have a holiday, ensures that most factories, shops, and offices will never be shut. While this arrangement has much to recommend it, there are social inconveniences arising from it. There may be, for example, five workers in a household, no two of whom will ever have a free day at the same time. In its application to office and administrative work it seems to be an unmitigated nuisance.

The Five-Year Plan presents to the people in dramatic form the idea of consciously planned industrial organization. The effect upon the working spirit of the people is a greater expenditure of energy, a greater production

of goods. The Russians are frank in criticism of their own failure to carry out any part of the Plan, and this severity of criticism falls so harshly that there is a reluctance to accept responsibility. The more important tests of the Plan will be in agriculture, in transport, and in the heavy industries. (This reminds the reviewer of Magnetogorsk, that mushroom town in the Urals, where Russia is making a determined effort to establish the largest steel works in the world.) The effect of the Five-Year Plan on thrift is interesting. Thrift is not dependent on the dispositions of individuals. Rather the Government decides each year how much is to be saved by deciding that so much labour and time shall be devoted to the provision of capital goods rather than to the production of things that can be immediately enjoyed. The immediate interests of Russians is being deliberately sacrificed, and they know it, but are content to make the sacrifice in the interests of future economic advantage.

There are chapters on problems of organization, labour problems, Russian court procedure which seems to be very informal, propaganda in Moscow, a Russian school which shows that an important experiment in education is proceeding there. It certainly is sound to conjoin formal instruction with real experience. It is a question, however, whether it is sound educational procedure to limit this union to learning about economic matters. Russia seems to be altogether too much obsessed with economic considerations. There are also interesting observations on Bolshevism and the Church, Bolshevism and Art, Russia and Freedom of Thought, Russia and World Peace.

Here are thirty-six pages of closely-packed, shrewd observation, presented with great care and discrimination of judgment. One feels that there is here no preconception or bias, and that one may accept the author's statements as authentic, which seems to be more than one can say of a good many books on Russia.

H. TASMAN LOVELL.

ON THE NIGHTMARE. By Ernest Jones, M.D. International Psycho-Analytical Library, No. 20. The Hogarth Press; 1931. Price: 21/-.

This book is a comprehensive and scholarly treatment of this universally interesting subject. In scope of reference it is surely the most authentic book on the subject. The references are copious and the documentation excellent. The references are given in the original languages and usually a translation is added. Part I treats of the Pathology of the Nightmare, Part II with the Connections between the Nightmare and certain Mediæval Superstitions, Part III with the Mare and the Mara: A Psycho-Analytical Contribution to Etymology. In the Preface the author writes: "What is at issue is nothing less than the very meaning of religion itself. In this book I have brought forward reasons why an intensive study of the Nightmare and the beliefs held about it makes it hard to avoid the conclusion that religion is in its essence one of the means . . . of helping mankind to cope with the burden of guilt and fear every one inherits in his unconscious from the deepest stirrings of mental life, the primordial conflict over incest."

The three cardinal features of the malady are (1) agonizing dread; (2) sense of oppression or weight at the chest which alarmingly interferes with respiration; (3) conviction of helpless paralysis . . . "Throughout the next day it is common for the patient still to suffer from malaise, heaviness and depression, dread, lack of confidence, pains in the head and weakness in the lower extremities" (p. 25).

Regarding the pathogenesis of the Nightmare Dr. Jones raises the question whether the Nightmare is due rather to predisposition than to certain exciting causes, such as indigestion, interference with respiration or circulation, or nervous disturbance due to fearful or excitable ideas of the preceding evening. The author finds the exciting causes insufficient because simple observation has shown that the alleged factors occur frequently without being followed by

Nightmare, and because frequently attacks of Nightmare occur without having been preceded by any of the alleged factors.

The author takes up a different standpoint. The most prominent feature of the Nightmare is the overmastering dread of some external oppression against which all the energies of the mind appear vainly to be fighting. The manifestations are pre-eminently mental, the central one being a morbidly acute feeling of *Angst*. *Angst*, according to the school of psycho-analysts, is generated by various abnormalities in the functioning of the sexual activities of the individual, the association between the sexual instinct and the emotion of fear being a very intimate one. For the author, "the malady known as Nightmare is always an expression of intense mental conflict centreing about some form of 'repressed' sexual desire" (p. 44). As in the Nightmare dread is at a maximum, the source of it must lie in the region of maximum repression, i.e., in suppressed incestuous desires. Therefore "an attack of the Nightmare is an expression of a mental conflict over an incestuous desire" (p. 44). This conflict theory of Nightmare is, according to the author, better able than any other to generalize the known facts of the condition. By it diverging views and observations can, he thinks, be reconciled.

The author argues his case very carefully and very ably. Whether one accept his theory or not, one cannot, after reading his exposition, be satisfied with any superficial reference to exciting causes. One must agree that the cause lies much deeper than that. And just herein lies a great service of the psycho-analysts in that they insist on penetrating deeper into the psyche in search of real causes.

In Part II the author examines learnedly certain mediæval superstitions, such as Incubus and Incubaion; the Vampire; the Werewolf; the Devil Witches. In Part III he treats of the Horse and the Night-Fiend; the Horse and Infantile Sexuality; the Horse and Mediæval Superstitions; the MR Root, the section being a psycho-analytical contribution to etymology.

Dr. Ernest Jones has now won such prestige among British psycho-analysts that anything he writes must be treated with great respect. In this book he has presented so interesting and learned a treatment of his subject that even those who do not accept all psycho-analytical findings will find the work both valuable and enthralling.

H. TASMAN LOVELL.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

ECONOMY AND TECHNIQUE OF LEARNING. By William F. Book. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co.; 1932. Price: 2 dollars.

ESSAI SUR LA SIMULTANÉITÉ A DISTANCE. By W. Rivier. Archives de la Société Belge de Philosophie. Brussels; 1932. Price: 15 francs.

REPORT: LONDON CHILD GUIDANCE CLINIC. Tudor Lodge, i, Canonbury Place, London.

JOURNALS RECEIVED.

MIND. A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy. Macmillan & Co. Annual subscription: 16s.

Vol. XLI. No. 164. Probability: The Deductive and Inductive Problems: W. E. Johnson. A Defence of Freethinking in Logistics: H. W. B. Joseph. Logical Constructions (III): John Wisdom. A Catalogue of Berkeley's Library: R. I. Aaron.

PHILOSOPHY. Journal of the British Institute of Philosophy. Published quarterly. Macmillan & Co. Subscription: 14s. a year.

Vol. VII. No. 28. On Fundamentals—An Adventure: Douglas Fawcett. Indeterminacy and Indeterminism: F. R. Hoare. Physics and the Ontological Problem: G. N. M. Tyrrell. A Phenomenological System of Ethics (I): Mary Evelyn Clarke. History and Sociology: Morris Ginsberg. Professor Stout's Realism—A Criticism: J. E. Turner. How to Teach Philosophy: John Lewis.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. Columbia University, New York. Annual subscription: 4 dollars.

Vol. XXIX. No. 16. Contingency and the New Era in Metaphysics (I): Charles Hartshorne. Is There Logical Force in Demonstration?: Marie C. Swabey. No. 17. Intellectual and Moral Obligation: A. Myrton Frye. Contingency and the New Era in Metaphysics (II): Charles Hartshorne. No. 18. The Directive Influence in Living Organisms: Ralph S. Lillie. The Analysis of the Subject-Predicate Proposition: A. Ushenko. No. 19. The Nature of Communication: David Rynin. A Note on Compound Propositions: David F. Swenson. No. 21. Reason as Fact and as Fetish (I): Horace M. Kallen.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS. Official Organ of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. Baillière, Tindall & Cox. Annual subscription: 30s.

Vol. III. Part 3. Libidinal Types: Sigmund Freud. Female Sexuality: Sigmund Freud. On the Ætiology of Drug-Addiction: Edward Glover. A Note on Depersonalization: M. N. Searl. The Dread of Woman: Karen Horney. A Contribution to the Problem of Libidinal Development of the Genital Phase in Girls: Josine Mueller.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA. University of the Sacred Heart. Milan. Annual subscription: L. 50-30

Vol. XXIV. No. 4. Ancora Alberto Magno e l'averroismo latino: A. Masnovo. Uno sconosciuto discepolo di Scoto. Intorno alla prescienza di Dio: M. Schmaus. Di un punto meno noto del periodo romano del Campanella: R. Amerio. Due lettere ignorante di P. Gallupi su Fichte, Schelling ed Hegel: E. Di Carlo.

ARCHIVIO GENERALE DI NEUROLOGIA, PSICHIATRIA E PSICOANALISI. Naples. Annual subscription: 8 dollars.

Vol. XIII. No. 2. Malariaterapia delle psicosi non luetiche: M. Levi Bianchini e J. Nardi.

REVUE DE L'INSTITUT DE SOCIOLOGIE. Parc Léopold, Brussels. Annual subscription: 100 francs.

Vol. II. No. 2. Ethnologues contemporains—Le R. P. Paul Schebesta: Jean Leyder. Les Pygmées sont-ils menacés d'extinction?: R. P. Schebesta. Le langage du bas-peuple et le moi inférieur des individus et des sociétés (cont.): Alfredo Niceforo. Examen sociologique de la Constitution soviétique: Daniel Warnotte.

THE HUMAN FACTOR. Journal of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology. London. Annual subscription: £1.

Vol. VI. No. 8. The Institute's First Decade: D. T. John. Incentives in Russian Industry: G. H. Miles. Some School Problems for Industrial Psychology: W. J. Messer. A Note on the Influence of Holidays on Body Weight: M. S. Munro. The Worker's Point of View—VI. Craft-Distinction in the Factory: Louis Katin. No. 9. Improvements to Factory Windows: Charles E. Jacob. The Worker's Point of View—VII. The Personal Element in the British Coal Industry: J. H. Mitchell. No. 10. Industrial Psychology in Agriculture: Editorial. Vocational Guidance and the Health of the Industrial Worker: Angus Macrae. The Worker's Point of View—VIII. Working Conditions and Morale: T. H. Hargrave.

REVUE DE PSYCHOLOGIE APPLIQUÉE DE L'EST. Nancy, France. Quarterly. Annual subscription : 25 francs.

Vol. II. No. 3. Essai sur l'éducation de la jeune fille moderne : J. Benech. No. 4. Adaptation du Médecin aux Colonies J. Fourche. Dix Ans de Travail de l'Institut Scientifique de l'Organisation du Travail de Kazan (U.R.S.S.) : C. Camilovitch and P. Varé. No. 5. Séance de la Société de Psychologie Appliquée de l'Est Psychologie comparée des hauts salaires américains et des salaires européens : François de Menthon. L'acuité visuelle et l'acuité auditive chez les écoliers : M. Foucault.

ECONOMIC RECORD. Journal of the Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand. Price : 5s.

Vol. VIII. Supplement on World Economic Influences. The Stabilisation of Sterling : D. B. Copland. The Course of World Prices : L. F. Giblin. Reparations and War Debts : G. L. Wood. The Australian Balance of Payments : Roland Wilson. Some Aspects of the Sterling-Group Proposals : C. V. Janes. The Gold Situation : Beryl Rouch. Political Obstacles to World Recovery : W. M. Ball. Fundamental Presuppositions for Successful Economic Planning : A. G. B. Fisher. The Rationalisation Movement and Australian Industry : F. R. E. Mauldon. The Crisis in New Zealand : E. P. Neale. Some Problems of Dairy Marketing : F. B. Stephens. International Researches into Relative Costs of Maintenance of Different Families : D. T. Sawkins.

PACIFIC AFFAIRS. Journal of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Honolulu. Price : 5 cents a copy.

Vol. V. No. 8. Education and Native Peoples : Felix M. Keesing. China's Student Politicians : E. H. Anstice. University and Community : Robert E. Park. Survey of Silver—II : Herbert M. Bratter. Educational Trends : The Editor. No. 9. Economic Conditions in China : Chen Han-Seng. The League in Manchuria : The Editor. No. 10. Legality of the Chinese Boycott : Kenzo Takayanagi. China and the Rule of Law : Ju-Ao Mei. Imperial Economists at Ottawa : Robert A. Mackay.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW. Washington Square East, New York City.

Vol. X. No. 1. Rudiments of Statutory Interpretation : Frederick J. de Sloovere. Principles of the New Draft of the Roumanian Code of Commerce : Josif C. Cohen.

ARCHIVOS BRASILEIROS DE HIGIENE MENTAL. Official Organ of the Brazilian League of Mental Hygiene. Rio de Janeiro.

Nol. V. No. 1. Nova Phase : Editorial. Enfermagem no tratamento das neuroses : J. P. Porto-Carrero. Prophylaxia mental da imigração : A. Xavier de Oliveira. Subsídio para a adaptação brasileira dos tests de Binet-Terman (cont.) : Ernani Lopes.

THE MORPETH REVIEW. The St. John's College Press, Morpeth, N.S.W. Annual subscription : 7s. 6d.

Vol. II. No. 21. Poverty : E. H. Burgmann. Christianity : Kenneth Henderson. Agrarian Problem in Russia : E. J. Bryce. Rationalisation : J. A. Merlo. Racial Clash : A. P. Elkin. Autumn : Kenneth Scott. Man's Quest for God : Prof. Woodruff. School English : Gavin Long. Leadership : H. K. Archdall.

ANNALI DELLA R. SCUOLA NORMALE SUPERIORE DI PISA. University of Pisa. Published quarterly. Annual subscription : L. 80. Series II. Vol. I. Part 3. La Personalità di Caligola : A. Momigliano. Sulla storia del concetto di Rinascimento : D. Cantimori.

ARCHIVIO GENERALE DI BIOPSIKOLOGIA, BIOPSIKOPATOLOGIA E BIOPSIKOTERAPIA. Official Organ of the Institute of Biopsychotherapy. University of Rome. Annual subscription : L. 30.

Vol. I. No. 1. Le prime recensioni della stampa internazionale de "Il Processo fine della coscienza". (Summary.) Biopsicoterapia—Il nuovo sistema terapeutico—"Procedimento corticale": Casimiro Frank.

LE LIVRE. Periodical dealing with Philosophy, Art, History, Science and Sociology. Published quarterly. 108 Boulevard St. Germain, Paris.

THE MEDICAL JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA. Published weekly. The Printing House, Seamer Street, Glebe, Sydney.

NOTES AND NEWS.

We regret to announce the death, on August 26th, of Mr. John Harward, of Warwick, Queensland. The late Mr. Harward was a Master of Arts of Oxford University, who on retirement from the position of Director of Education in Ceylon, took up his residence in Queensland. He was a keen supporter of this Journal and one of its most valued contributors. Recently, he published, with the Cambridge University Press, a scholarly translation (with Introduction and Notes) of "The Platonic Epistles." The review of this work appeared in our September issue, unfortunately too late for the author to read it.

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We have also to record, with great regret, the death of Dr. F. W. Dunlop, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Otago, New Zealand, and a member of the Council. The late Professor Dunlop had been on leave during this year on account of ill-health. He was about to return from the North Island when his death occurred.

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We are glad to note that Mr. W. M. Kyle, of the University of Queensland, has sufficiently recovered from his serious illness to return to his home in Brisbane.

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During 1932 the Melbourne University Philosophical Society held eight meetings, with an average attendance of 41.

Political philosophy was given considerable prominence in the programme. Mr. Ball, who returned from Europe this year, gave an address on the "Place of Political Studies in University Teaching", Professor Paton dealt with "Logic and the Social Sciences" and Mr. McCay, the past secretary of the Society, read a paper entitled "Concerning a Socialist Jurisprudence".

But the realms of pure philosophy were not altogether abandoned, for Father Loughnan presented a study in scholastic philosophy in his address on the "Analogy of Being".

Professor Gunn, who had also just returned from abroad, related some of his experiences with the Council for Psychic Research in an address on "Psychology and Psychic Research". Professor Gunn's play "Spinoza, Maker of Lenses" was read at one meeting of the Society to commemorate the Spinoza Tercentenary.

A Question Evening was again held dealing with Ethical Questions, and a symposium by honours students entitled "Body and Mind" was presented.

OFFICE-BEARERS FOR 1933.

President: Professor W. R. Boyce Gibson.

Vice-Presidents: Mrs. O. Warren, Professor J. Alexander Gunn, Mr. W. M. Ball, Mr. W. A. Merrylees (*ex officio*).

Secretary: Mr. A. H. Norman.

Treasurer: Miss A. Baldwin.

Committee: Miss S. Murphy, Miss C. Duncan, Mr. G. A. Wood, Mr. G. G. Powell.

Hon. Auditor: Father H. B. Loughnan, S.J.

THE JOHN MURTAGH MACROSSAN MEMORIAL LECTURESHIP, 1933.

Dr. A. H. Martin, Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Sydney and Honorary Director of the Australian Institute of Industrial Psychology, has been invited by the Senate of the University of Queensland to accept the John Murtagh Macrossan Lectureship for 1933. The lecture will be given in the month of September, and the subject will be some aspect of "Industrial Psychology". We have much pleasure in making this announcement, and congratulate Dr. Martin upon the distinction.

This memorial Lectureship was founded in 1925 by a gift from the Trustees of the late John Murtagh Macrossan, formerly Secretary for Mines and Works.

The lecture must be given in Brisbane on some subject approved by the Senate relating to : (a) The life and work of any person, not living at the time of the lecture, who has rendered distinguished service in public life to Australia or any of the Australian States and Colonies. (b) Australian History. (c) Political Economy. (d) Sociology. (e) Science. (f) Law. (g) Art. (h) Literature. Provided that at least every alternate lecture shall be on some subject coming under either the first or second heading.

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The Brisbane Branch of the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy held its final meeting for the year at the University on the night of Monday, October 17th. The chair was taken by the President, Professor M. Scott Fletcher, M.A., B.Litt. Mr. E. J. Dunlop, B.A., District Inspector of Schools, gave an interesting address on "Examinations—Modern Criticisms and Suggestions". After explaining that the views he expressed were personal, and not to be taken as a statement of official opinion, Mr. Dunlop proceeded to indicate the trend of current educational thought with regard to examinations, and referred to the International Conference on Examinations held at Eastbourne, England, early this year. He discussed the merits and defects of both the traditional "essay" type of examination and the newer "objective" type popular in the United States of America, and in conclusion made a number of practical suggestions for the improvement of examination methods. In the discussion which followed members and visitors exhibited a keen interest in the subject and a hearty appreciation of the lecture.

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The Fifth Annual Report of the Australian Institute of Industrial Psychology has recently been issued. Despite the hard conditions in industry the Institute has held its own. A great deal of research on tests and methods has been accomplished, useful propaganda has been carried on, a wider knowledge of the Institute's service is apparent, and confidence in it is steadily increasing. The recommendation of satisfied clients has enabled the Institute to maintain its position in the present difficult times. We congratulate the Hon. Director, Dr. A. H. Martin, on the work done during the year, and take the opportunity of expressing our sympathy with him in his recent painful illness and our pleasure at his restoration to health.

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This year the Graduation Address of the Otago University, New Zealand, was delivered by Professor Richard Lawson, M.A., Litt.D., Professor of Education in the University. The subject of the address was "Idea and Realization". We extract the following :

"Culture is not intellectual attainment ; it is a mode of life, an appreciation of good things, a refinement of taste, a self discipline, a just recognition of values, a desire to live beautifully. The problems of democracy may or may not be solved ; but it is certain that a necessary condition of solution is a new conception of culture in consonance with the world we are daily immersed in."

This high-minded address must have given great pleasure to all concerned.

The President of the University of Minnesota, Dr. Lotus D. Coffman, who visited Australia recently as the representative of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, has, since his return to America, published an address on *Education and the Depression*. In this address, while acknowledging the necessity for national economy, President Coffman makes a strong defence of university education as it has been arduously built up. He expresses the hope that retrenchment of this invaluable national service shall not be recklessly undertaken, indeed, not undertaken at all unless quite unavoidable. He points out rightly the injury that would be caused to organized university education with its numerous gains of the past years of endeavour, and draws attention to the difficulty that would be experienced in rebuilding again later on. He says: "Unfortunately the move for retrenchment has sometimes taken the form of attacks on educational and humanitarian institutions. The problems relating to education are too vital to be considered in terms of emotion or prejudice." And again, "We must do what the Premier of Australia told the Premier of New South Wales to do the other day, when the Premier of New South Wales refused to pay the interest of the State's foreign debt. The Premier of New South Wales said: 'If we must choose between maintaining our credit by paying our foreign bondholders and feeding our hungry, we shall do the latter'. The Premier of Australia replied, 'You will do both'. And so shall we in Minnesota heal our sick, feed our hungry, and aid the distressed, fulfilling at the same time our obligation to provide competent teachers and an adequate educational program for our youth." Further on President Coffman said: "It is popular in these days to say: 'Cut out the frills, let us return to the essentials'. But the frills for the most part represent our investments in idealism." Finally, referring to the emoluments of professors, President Coffman said: "One does not become a professor before middle life. Men who chose the academic life as a career did so with no thought of fortune in mind. They knew they would be working at a financial loss when business conditions were good; they knew that there would be no relation of their salaries to rising markets. Never once in all their experience did they expect fortune would come to them because of an upward swing of the market. Even now in the present crisis the facts show that their incomes coincide almost exactly with the curve of the cost of living. For twenty years they have been living on deflated incomes, struggling as best they could to advance learning and to promote scholarship. In so far as they were affected by economic motives they chose teaching for two reasons, namely, the tradition that men in professional positions have permanency of tenure and the assurance of continuity of employment and income without regard to business cycles. A lower income than most of them would have earned in other professions or business was cheerfully accepted because of security of tenure and salary. They were willing to devote themselves to the intellectual life and to social progress in the faith that these assurances would be kept. They took, so to speak, the vows of a self-denying profession for the benefit of youth and human progress."

One result of President Coffman's visit to Australia is a grant of 10,500 dollars from the Carnegie Corporation of New York to the Board of Social Study and Training of New South Wales. This amount is to be paid in three yearly instalments of 3,500 dollars each. As the exchange is very favourable at present the Board has profited thereby, too. Moreover, the Corporation has invited Miss Aileen Fitzpatrick, B.A., the Board's Director of Studies, to visit America and investigate the training of social workers. Miss Fitzpatrick has already sailed for the United States of America.

The Carnegie Corporation has been very generous to the cause of education in Australia. The result has been grants for adult education, then a large grant which led to the constitution of the Australian Council for Educational Research, and then the grant to the Board of Social Study and Training. Recently, another representative in the person of Mr. Douie, of London University, visited Sydney to inquire mainly into the requirements of the adult education movement.

